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APRIL, 1980

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What are the worldwide implications of the resurgence of Islam? How will the schisms in the Muslim world affect the structures and foreign policies of the Islamic nations? In this issue, seven articles deal with these questions. As our introductory article points out, "In a variety of contexts ranging from the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula to the modernist adaptations of Egypt and the more radical experiments of Islamic republics in Libya and Iran, Muslims are working to create societies that are clearly Islamic and at the same time are effective participants in the modern world."

The Islamic Past and the Present Resurgence

BY JOHN O. VOLL

Associate Professor of History, University of New Hampshire

THE continuing vitality of Islam is clearly visible in the contemporary world. Revolutions and demonstrations are part of a broader reaffirmation by Muslims of their faith. Throughout the Islamic world there is a major effort to assert the continuing validity of the teachings of Islam in the context of modern history. Legal systems are being examined and changed in the light of Islamic ideals. Social institutions are being judged in terms of Islamic expectations. Political experience is being shaped by memories of the past and hopes for a more fully Islamic future.

The reaffirmation of Islam takes different forms, depending on local conditions. In some areas, it is the product of government action, and elsewhere it is centered in the activities of non-government associations and individuals. However, behind the diversity is a common belief in the truth of Islam regardless of changing circumstances.

At the core of the Islamic experience is the belief in one God, the Lord of all creation and the source of all law and judgment, who gives guidance to humanity through revelations to a series of prophets. For Muslims, the final and most complete revelation was presented through Muhammad and is recorded in the Qur'an. Divine guidance is not only a matter of individual faith, it also provides the blueprint for the human community on earth. Islam defines both the relationship of the individual to God and the role of the proper, divinely guided community on earth. This is what is meant by the often repeated generalization that Islam is not just a creed, it is a "total way of life."

The attempt to create a community in accord with the revelation of God is a key theme in the history of

Islam. When the Prophet Muhammad began to receive the revelations in the seventh century, he gathered around him a group of believers. Initially, this small group lived in Mecca in the western part of the Arabian Peninsula. When these early Muslims faced the opposition of the leadership of Mecca, they moved to a neighboring town where they established their own independent community that soon expanded to control most of the Arabian Peninsula, including Mecca. Muslims date the Islamic era from this migration in 622 A.D. In the new community there was no separation of political life from the guidance of the religious message. Muhammad was both prophet and political leader, and membership in the community meant accepting the implications of the revelation in all aspects of life. The actions of Muhammad as the leader of this new community provided an example for Muslims then and in later times. Traditions about the life of the Prophet came to be seen as a complement to the revelation from God. In this way, the Qur'an (God's revelation) and the Sunna (customs or traditions) of the Prophet were created as the basic norms for Islamic belief and practice.

The death of Muhammad in 632 A.D. was the new community's first major crisis. The critical issue was the nature of the leadership. What may originally have been simple personal rivalries were tied to broader theological positions defining the nature and purpose of leadership. Muhammad was succeeded by Abu Bakr, an early companion of the Prophet, who was elected by an informal process of nomination and election. While his succession was accepted by the majority of the community, some felt that leadership

should have passed to Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali. This latter group were called the Party of Ali, or Shi'at Ali, and form the basis for the Shi'a tradition in Islam.

Internal disagreement did not stop the rapid expansion of the Islamic community. Under the second and third caliphs ("successors"), Muslims came to rule a vast empire in the Middle East and North Africa. Although early leadership adhered closely to the guidelines set in the Qur'an and the Sunna, the transformation of the community from a small state to a large empire was accompanied by the adoption of many of the practices and structures of earlier non-Islamic empires.

Ali became the fourth caliph, but his rule was marked by civil war. In the new sociopolitical context, the definition of the community and its leadership assumed increasing importance. During the civil war, the major alternatives emerged as conflicting factions, laying the bases for long-standing divisions within Islam.

Opposition to Ali came from several sources. The supporters of the first three caliphs appear to have seen Ali as a threat to established community traditions. Other opposition came from the Umayyad clan, the dominant group in pre-Islamic Mecca. The Umayyads were practical merchants and despite their initial opposition to Muhammad their administrative skills had made them important leaders in the community, political "realists" and empire builders. A third element of opposition to Ali came from more puritanical Muslims, who initially supported Ali but withdrew from his camp when it appeared that he was willing to compromise with the Umayyads. Known as the "Withdrawers" or Kharijites, they advocated a vigorous egalitarianism, claiming the right to rebel against any leader who did not follow Islam perfectly and completely.

Although Ali lost this conflict and was murdered in 661 A.D., the memory of his piety and his special relationship with the Prophet became the foundation for a distinctive tradition within Islam: Shi'ism, which emphasized the need for a personal focus of divine guidance. Shi'ites came to define the Muslim community as that community led by a distinctive individual who received special guidance from God. This leader, called the Imam, had to be a descendant of the Prophet and of Ali, and deserved the obedience of all Muslims.

Thus two major Islamic orientations emerged. One emphasized the importance of maintaining an unbroken line of divinely guided leaders and was predominant in Shi'a Islam. The other stressed the importance of the community as the object of divine guidance, and worked to maintain a continuity of communal traditions. This orientation is called Sunni Islam and characterizes the majority of Muslims. The

Kharijites' extreme egalitarianism and tendency to oppose established government institutions separated them from both the Sunni and the Shi'a groupings.

The Umayyads won the first civil war and established an empire based in Syria, ruled by an Arab-Muslim minority, since the conversion of the conquered population to Islam was relatively gradual. The Umayyads remained in power until 750 A.D. Opposition to their rule came from non-Arab converts to Islam who resented Arab-Muslim elitism and from pious opponents of Umayyad political "realism." Shi'a Islam provided a unifying banner for revolution and the Umayyads were replaced as caliphs by the Abbasids, descendants of an uncle of the Prophet.

Although they came to power as a Shi'a movement, the Abbasids rapidly divorced themselves from Shi'ism and became supporters of the Sunni Islam of the majority of their Muslim subjects. They were the heirs to the political realism of the Umayyads and maintained the imperial structures that the community had adopted from pre-Islamic governments. However, the Abbasid state utilized the broader range of peoples who were converting to Islam and was not confined to a small Arab-Muslim elite (which itself was absorbed into the emerging cosmopolitan Islamic society).

STYLES OF ISLAMIC EXPERIENCE

During the early caliphates, four Islamic styles emerged in response to historical experience. Although conditions and issues have changed, there is a remarkable continuity in the general Islamic patterns of action and response over the centuries.

The first style is one of adaptation and synthesis. In the political arena, this is visible in the realism of the early leaders, who utilized a wide range of techniques in creating the structures of the early empires. They adapted to sociopolitical realities and were willing to compromise when it was necessary for the maintenance of the state. In intellectual and theological terms, this pragmatic style was characteristic of those thinkers who adapted Greek philosophical traditions to explain Islamic positions. In general terms, this made possible the great cosmopolitan intellectual and political syntheses of medieval Islamic civilization.

The second is the conservative style. Once the Islamic community was established, there were Muslim leaders whose concern was to preserve the achievements of Islam. This mood was especially characteristic of many groups of scholars in the time of the early Abbasids. These learned men or ulama had reservations about the non-Islamic aspects of the imperial system created by the caliphs; but they tended to support the political leadership, however "realistic" or compromising, in preference to the danger of civil strife. Thus, by the end of the first civil war early pious circles came to accept the Umayyads,

and later ulama accepted the Abbasids. The ulama became the preservers of community traditions and, once a system of Islamic law was fully defined, came to avoid innovations. This conservatism served the Islamic community well when the Abbasid imperial structure began to crumble after the ninth century. It meant, however, that the learned religious class tended to be politically quietist and mistrustful of innovation. As conditions changed, the ulama maintained their conservatism, supporting the continuation of each status quo as it emerged in the Islamic community.

This conservatism is in sharp contrast to the fundamentalist style of Islamic experience. From the earliest days of Islam, some Muslims insisted on a rigorous adherence to the rules of the faith. This spirit animated the early Kharijites but, by the time of the Abbasid caliphs, Sunni ulama became the leading exponents of this rigorism. The careful study of the life of the Prophet provided a focus for those who insisted that life in the Islamic community should be based strictly on the Qur'an and the Sunna. A key figure in this development was Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855), whose vigorous opposition to political compromise and philosophical innovation set the tone for the later fundamentalist spirit in Islam.

The fundamentalists were determined to preserve the basic message explicitly defined in the Qur'an and the Sunna. They were not, however, conservative, in that they did not accept conditions as they were. They used a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna as the basis for judging existing institutions. In this way, they were often political activists and, in contrast to the conservative ulama's acceptance of an accumulating intellectual tradition, they frequently claimed the right of independent interpretation of the basic sources of the faith. The fundamentalists were thus the strongest leaders who maintained the vision of the early ideal community, and they frequently advocated programs of Islamic purification and revival. This spirit has inspired some Islamic movements from the early days down to the present.

These three styles tend to be community oriented, regardless of their differences in spirit and tone. The fourth style places emphasis on the more personal and individual aspects of Islam. While all Muslims recognize the importance of Islam in their individual lives, some have stressed the importance of the individual's relationship with God rather than his communal obligations. The legal structures and community institutions were to be subordinated to the demands of personal piety and the commands of charismatic, divinely guided individuals. In political terms, this personalized Islamic style is most common among Shi'a Muslims, with their belief in the imams. However, even some Sunni Muslims developed a popular belief in the future coming of a messiah figure or

"mahdi," whose divinely guided rule would supplant existing institutions. Expectations of the Mahdi and Shi'a sentiments frequently resulted in revolts against the existing order. Personalized Islam is also seen in the development of a mystic tradition. In Islamic mysticism, or Sufism, the divinely guided teacher usually was not politically active. Originally, Sufi teachers were individuals respected for their asceticism and devotional piety. Later, groups of disciples gathered around such teachers and, by the twelfth century, these groups came to be organized into brotherhoods called *tariqas*. While these orders became an important part of the Islamic community structure, they maintained an element of respect for personal charisma and the individual's devotional experience.

These four styles of Islamic experience are not mutually exclusive. They represent orientations within the broader Islamic experience and are combined with varying degrees of emphasis in any specific group. It is useful, however, to identify these component parts as a way of understanding the dynamics of Islamic diversity.

The different styles of Islamic experience have played roles of varying importance in Islamic history since the time of the great Abbasid empire. Islam's political unity was disappearing by the ninth century. Although there were Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad until 1258, they gradually lost control over the far-flung provinces of the empire. Military commanders and local leaders emerged as the dominant political force throughout the Islamic world. Political fragmentation was accompanied by invasions from the outside and migrations of new peoples into the Middle East. The most important new groups were Turkish-speaking peoples from Central Asia, who were soon integrated into Islamic society and became a key element in Islamic armies. Crusaders from Europe and Mongol armies from Central Asia provided the major threats to the Islamic world from the outside.

Although no group was able to reestablish political unity in the Islamic world, the centuries of turmoil from the tenth to the sixteenth were not times of Islamic weakness. Islam expanded greatly during this period, spreading deep into Africa, throughout the Indian Ocean basin and into Central Asia. Invaders were either defeated or were converted to Islam.

The style of Islamic adaptation and synthesis helped to create new states and social institutions that were able to adjust to the changing conditions of the Islamic community. The sultans, the military commanders and political rulers, utilized various governing techniques and adopted new military technologies. In social and religious terms, Islamic teachers were flexible in adapting Islamic teachings to special local conditions.

The conservative ulama helped to preserve the

gains made by Islam by making sure that changes were not too rapid. When adaptation and compromise seemed to be going too far in the direction of diluting the Islamic message, fundamentalist teachers and movements arose, demanding a more strict adherence to fundamentals. Sometimes this resulted in revolutionary movements that established new states; at other times the result was a less militant reaffirmation of the Islamic tradition within existing institutions.

The more personalized style of Islam seen in the Sufi brotherhoods provided a means to express an individualized Islamic identity. These brotherhoods were flexible in expressing Islamic piety through forms adapted to the specific circumstances of individual believers. They also provided social organizations to protect people in times of political turmoil. On occasion they provided an organizational framework for a more active expression of Islamic sentiment, a vehicle for conversion to Islam or for fundamentalist reaffirmation.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the success and dynamism of the Islamic community were clear. A belt of Islamic states and growing Muslim communities stretched from Southeast Asia to West Africa. In the middle of this belt, the Moghul Empire dominated India, the Safavid state brought unity to Iran, and the Ottoman Empire stretched across the Mediterranean world. It was only in Spain that this expansive dynamism had been reversed. In this way, the Islamic community entered the modern era of world history in a position of visible strength. This confirmation of the Islamic way of life may be a factor in the later Muslim unwillingness to abandon Islamic institutions in favor of those developed in the West.

The organizational strength and intellectual dynamism of the early modern Muslim empires began to decline by the eighteenth century. Internally, there was a natural decline in administrative efficiency as vested interest groups protected their positions. Tensions among conservatives, fundamentalists and reforming adaptationists began to dilute the sense of mission that had inspired the empire builders. In addition, the emergence of a world economic system centered in West Europe began subtly to undermine the economic foundations of Islamic institutions. Developments in military technology in Europe outpaced the Muslim willingness to adopt them, creating a power imbalance between European and Muslim states.

MODERN MUSLIM EXPERIENCE

During the nineteenth century, the growth of European economic and military power in relation to Islam resulted in European dominance over most of the Islamic world. Muslims reacted in a variety of ways, although the historic styles of the Islamic experiences remained. Rulers tended to be realists

and attempted to adopt new methods and ideas. In the eighteenth century, Ottoman sultans had already begun to try to reorganize the military along Western lines. Even more thoroughgoing changes were introduced in the nineteenth century. In Egypt, Muhammad Ali reorganized both the military and the economy in an effort to adapt to changing circumstances. Sultan Mahmud II made similar efforts in the Ottoman Empire. Although successors to these leaders continued the effort and effected major structural changes, European dominance continued. By the twentieth century, Islamic reformers began to advocate a broader transformation of society. The first of the reformers to gain power was Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the leader in Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. Ataturk instituted a program of reform that attempted to isolate Turkish society from its Ottoman and Islamic political heritage and thereby to create a modern and secular state.

Other leaders in the Islamic world were not so explicitly secularist as Ataturk. However, the major thrust of their programs was in the direction of a break with the Islamic tradition in order to create modernized societies. Following World War II, socialism provided the inspiration for the transformation of Islamic societies. Leaders in Egypt, Syria and Iraq were in the forefront of this movement when revolutions in those countries brought socialist-oriented leaders to power. In the political realm, modernizing adaptation seemed to mean a withdrawal from strict adherence to Islamic regulations and traditions.

Conservative-style Muslims also made their adjustments, resisting many changes introduced by the political adaptationists. However, once reforms had been established, the conservatives tended to remain true to their style, accepting the conditions created by the reformers. In this way, the conservative ulama of Egypt, for example, opposed the young socialists before the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, but then came to accept the socialism of President Gamal Abdel Nasser by the 1960's, seeing in it a possible "Islamic socialism." After Nasser's death in 1970, the conservative ulama came to accept the principles of the "Corrective Revolution" of Anwar Sadat. The Islamic revival of the 1970's was thus not the product of Islamic conservatism in Egypt or elsewhere.

The resurgence of Islam in the decade of the 1970's is associated with the fundamentalists. Throughout the modern era, there have been leaders and groups

(Continued on page 180)

John O. Voll has written on the modern history of the Sudan and on the history of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly in the early modern period. He was in Cairo, Egypt, in 1978-1979 under the Fulbright Faculty Research Abroad Program.

"Currently, all the ASEAN governments continue to hold the balance of power in their respective states. In each case, however, Islam presents a new area of increasing tension, both internally and externally."

Islam: Threat to ASEAN Regional Unity?

BY CARL A. TROCKI

Assistant Professor of History, Thomas More College

IN five Southeast Asian states, Islam is the religion of a significant proportion of the population.¹ In Indonesia and Malaysia, a majority or near majority of the population are Muslims. In adjoining areas of neighboring states, in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines and the city-state of Singapore, significant Muslim minorities have strong ties to the Muslim communities across the borders. All the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are thus deeply concerned with Islam.

In every ASEAN country, Islam must be reckoned with as a political force; the followers of the Prophet are not entirely satisfied with the existing political and social order in any ASEAN country. Because of this, Islam may be seen as a potential threat to the stability of the ASEAN alliance.

Because there are significant ethnic divisions and important distinctions in the social and political status of Muslims in each state, generalizations about the Islamic population of the region are open to doubt. Nevertheless, the growing international stature of Islam in western Asia could easily provide the catalyst that would unify Islam in this region.

The history of Islam in Southeast Asia is distinct from the history of Islam in other parts of the world. The region was among the last areas of the world reached by propagators of the faith. Although a few rulers of petty states in north Sumatra and north Java were converted to Islam before 1400, Islam became a major force only in the mid-fifteenth century. Islam came, not in the form of a jihad, or holy war, but in the ships of Gujarati, Arabic and Malay traders moving along the trading network of the entrepot state of Malacca. Islam was spread initially by Sufi mystics, and even today Sufism is a strong element in the

region. The religion of the Prophet first took root among the merchant communities and in the courts of the rulers who profited from their trade.

Until the late nineteenth century, Islam did not apparently have a major impact on the peasant masses of the region, most of whom mixed the new religion with substantial doses of earlier Buddhist, Hindu or animistic beliefs. Despite syncretic tendencies, Southeast Asian Islam has generally retained links with the Islamic mainstream in South Asia and the Middle East, and most Southeast and Asian Muslims are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi rite.²

Partly as a reaction to European colonial rule and partly in response to the Islamic reform movement in the Middle East, Islam took deeper roots among the masses of the Malay-speaking peoples in the nineteenth century. Many Malays and Indonesians traveled to Mecca to make the Hajj, and missionaries and teachers firmly established Islam in the villages. In the twentieth century, Islam was a rallying point for nationalist, anti-colonial movements, particularly in the British-controlled Malay states and the Dutch East Indies.

The long-term political role of Islam in modern Malaysia and Indonesia has, however, been an issue fraught with tension. The place of Islam in the largely secular, nationalist ideologies of these states has been ambivalent, largely because both states have significant non-Muslim minorities. Because Islam sees no distinction between church and state, a theocratic order is the avowed political ideal of orthodox Muslims. If nationalist integration is to be achieved on the basis of a common faith, how are the non-Muslims to be accommodated?

This has been a classic dilemma in Indonesian politics since even before independence in 1946. Although the first major national independence movement gathered around the *Sarekat Islam* between 1911 and 1916, the movement rapidly developed more secular tendencies. The secularization of Indonesian nationalism arose partly as a result of Western modernist influences and partly because of the nature of Islam in Java, the home of 90 percent of all Indonesians.

Perhaps nowhere else is Islam so compromised by

¹Although Burma has a substantial Muslim minority (4 percent) and there are a few Muslims in Vietnam (.11 percent) the present study will be limited to a discussion of Islam in the five states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. The Muslim minority that once lived in Cambodia may well not have survived the most recent upheavals there.

²Richard V. Weekes, editor, *Muslim Peoples, A World Ethnographic Survey* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. xxv.

TABLE 1: Muslim Population of ASEAN

Country	Total Pop. 1977 (millions)	Muslim Pop. 1977 (millions)	% of Muslims
Indonesia	136.9	123.2	90%
Malaysia	12.6	5.5	44%
Philippines	44.3	2.3	5.3%
Singapore	2.3	.345	15%
Thailand	44.4	1.7	4%
Total	240.5	133.045	55.3%

Source: Richard V. Weekes, editor, *Muslim Peoples, A World Ethnographic Survey* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 499-527.

indigenous cultural traditions. Javanese Islam, characterized by the label *abangan*, is highly syncretic and is mixed with elements of Hindu-Buddhism and animism. While the average Javanese peasant formally accepts Islam, most peasants are only "statistical" Muslims. The same label applies to the old Javanese *prijaji*, or aristocratic class. These groups are scorned by the *santri*, the more orthodox Muslims, many of whom are small traders. The *santri* who include more modern urban dwellers often see themselves, at least in terms of religion, as closer to the multiplicity of non-Javanese ethnic groups who inhabit Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo) and Sulawesi (Celebes). On the other hand, the Balinese resist Islam and persist in their Hindu beliefs, with a strong mixture of shamanism. The face of Islam in Indonesia is thus highly varied and syncretic. Nevertheless, Islam retains a major political role.

Former President Sukarno, whose major supporters were the *abangan* and the *Parti Komunis Indonesia* (PKI), was able to undercut Muslim political power and banned the largest Muslim party, *Masjumi*, in the early 1960's. The strongly anti-Communist Muslim mass movement contributed to his downfall in 1965 after the military takeover by General (now President) Suharto. Since 1965, however, those Muslims who are committed to an Islamic view of society have been disappointed by Suharto's New Order. As observer Ben Anderson noted, the Muslims

... had good reason to feel that the overthrow of Sukarno and the destruction of the PKI would at last make Islam a central political and moral force in Indonesian society.³

They also hoped for increased economic opportunities.

Suharto's military regime, however, frustrated both the economic and the political aspirations of Indonesian Muslims. Suharto never lifted the ban on *Masjumi*, and most of the economic advantages of his regime went to high-ranking military officers. In his analysis of the elections of 1971 and 1977, Anderson pointed out that Suharto's efforts to prevent the Muslims from gaining a significant share of political

power turned them against him. Suharto's policies helped assure victory for his Golkar party in 1971 but

... they helped to alienate permanently significant sectors of the Muslim community, who saw themselves once again deprived of their legitimate rights and place in Indonesian society. In addition, the one party which managed to hold its own against the government bulldozer, the conservative *Nahdatul Ulama*, alarmed the government by its tenacious hold on its rural following. ...⁴

This led to increased hostility among the army elite, who are mostly "statistical" Muslims.

Before the 1977 elections, the government forced the merger of all Islamic parties. It was hoped that rivalries would prevent unified action. A further attempt to cripple the Muslims was a government-imposed title, United Development party (PPP), which bore no hint of Islamic affiliation. The government was thwarted when the PPP showed unprecedented strength and polled 29 percent of the vote nationally, carrying the capital city of Jakarta.

Many *abangan* voters and substantial numbers of Christians cast their ballots for the PPP, in sharp contrast to previous voting patterns. Student militancy increased:

... in the wake of the elections, there were strong indications of new solidarities among the students, overriding traditional religious and other divisions. Non-Muslims were supporting Muslim student leaders and these leaders were increasingly absorbing non-Muslim "radical" concepts and analyses into their thinking.⁵

In reaction to overwhelming government corruption, intensified suppression of political freedom, and the progressive impoverishment of the population, Islam is becoming radicalized. Islam is apparently in the process of developing a serious socioeconomic alternative to Western and Marxist development strategies. The Muslim alternative is founded on an Islamic moral order infused with elements of social democracy. In addition, the Islamic strategy of armed struggle is finding adherents in countries like the Philippines and perhaps Thailand.

The Islamic political movement in Indonesia is possibly the most mature Islamic movement in Southeast Asia, although it has been hampered by internal divisions and the existence of a strong opposition. Its differences are being submerged in the growing op-

³Ben Anderson, "Last Days of Indonesia's Suharto?" *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, no. 63, July-August, 1978, p. 4.

⁴*Ibid.* p. 8.

⁵*Ibid.* p. 14.

position to Suharto. There are also sketchy reports about the appearance of a group of Islamic terrorists who are called Kommando Jihad, but the exact nature of the group is still a matter of some speculation.⁶

MALAYSIA: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

The status of Islam in Malaysia will undoubtedly be influenced by events in Indonesia, although Malaysia's Muslim community is in a somewhat different political situation. Islam is the established religion of the state and is an essential aspect of Malay identity (to be Malay means to be a Muslim). Orthodoxy is much stronger, and most Malays could pass for santri in Indonesia. Politics in Malaysia is deeply influenced by ethnic considerations. The government's National Front coalition is dominated by the United Malay National party (UMNO), an ethnic Malay party. Other ethnic groups have their own parties, some of which are members of the National Front. Unlike Indonesia, in Malaysia multi-ethnic parties have had little success, largely because of Malay insecurity regarding the economic position of the large Chinese minority.

Like all other ASEAN governments, Malaysia is committed to capitalist economic growth and to political stability. However, Malaysians are also committed to the economic and social advancement of the Malay community. To the latter end, a whole range of social, economic, political and educational advantages has been guaranteed to Malays under the constitution at the expense of the Chinese who have dominated the internal economy since the colonial period. Fears of unrest and insurgency have made it necessary for the UMNO elite to strike a bargain with the wealthy Chinese who dominate the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), a major partner in the National Front.

The UMNO leadership has generally presented itself as "moderate," seeking to maintain the shaky coalition with the Chinese elite on the one hand, while on the other retaining the loyalty of its own rural and urban Malay constituents. This has never been easy. In 1969, the possibility that a Chinese-dominated party might threaten the ruling coalition led to wide-

spread racial violence and the murder of almost 1,000 people.

Those Muslims who prefer a more rigorously Islamic social and political order have generally been dissatisfied with the UMNO leadership and have expressed opposition to any compromise with the Chinese. Right-wing leaders in UMNO have been characterized as demagogues and subjected to disciplinary measures. A more complex opposition has come from the traditional rural Muslims of the east coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu. In these areas where there are few Chinese, there are objections to the impingements of modernization and to the essentially secular nature of the bureaucratic state. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, this opposition was expressed by the Pan-Malayan Islamic party (PMIP, or PAS, as it is now known).

In his analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of the PMIP, anthropologist Clive Kessler has characterized the basic objections of the Kelantanese. The west coast Malays who dominate UMNO are outsiders in Kelantan. They come to the state offering material blandishments in the form of development projects and often bribes to local politicians. The PMIP has portrayed this approach as an appeal to greed, to the flesh or nafsu. The Kelantanese believe that moral aspirations or akal should receive first consideration. The party has rested largely on the support of village imams, the religious teachers who dominate rural society.⁷

Despite this idealistic appeal on the part of "extremist" Muslim leaders, Prime Minister Hussein Onn has been able to undercut their political strength. In 1978, he took advantage of corruption scandals and a split in the PAS to cut the party's representation in Parliament from 13 to 5. While the National Front strengthened its hold on Parliament (taking 131 out of 154 seats), it polled only 55 percent of the electorate in peninsular Malaysia. Thus both the Chinese-dominated left and the Malay right retain large followings who are growing increasingly impatient with the rigidity of UMNO rule.⁸

This shaky balance will face increasing challenges from the Islamic revival that is currently sweeping Malaysia's youth. There is a generation gap between the older, "moderate" Malay elite and the students. Muslim missionary groups called dakwah, calling for a "return" to pure Islamic law and custom, are gaining converts among Malay students. At the forefront of this movement is the Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement (ABIM), headed by the charismatic 32-year-old Anwar Ibrahim. The movement claims a membership of 35,000 and has been strongly influenced by recent developments in Iran, Pakistan and Libya.⁹

Associated with this movement have been "idol-smashing" attacks on Hindu (Indian) and Chinese

⁶"Toning Down the Voices of Faith," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), November 3, 1978, p. 24. Also see the comprehensive treatment of Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia in Rodney Tasker, "The Explosive Mix of Muhammad and Modernity," *FEER*, February 9, 1979, pp. 22-27.

⁷Clive S. Kessler, *Islam and Politics in a Malay State, Kelantan 1838-1969* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 220-232.

⁸Robert Shaplen, *A Turning Wheel* (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 159-160.

⁹Keyes Beech, "Fanaticism of Islamic Revival Alarms Many in Malaysia," *Los Angeles Times* (LAT), October 7, 1979. Also see other articles in this series in *LAT*, October 4, October 14, 1979.

Buddhist temples. In some areas, Malay women have adopted the chador, a practice that was never part of Southeast Asian Islam, where women have always exercised a great deal more freedom than in Middle Eastern countries. Some women have turned down scholarships to medical school and others have refused to accept factory jobs, claiming that their religion teaches them to stay home.

Paradoxical though it may seem to Westerners, both the successes and failures of the government's development plans make it the target of fundamentalist attacks. On the one hand, the government's corruption, its failure to ameliorate Malay poverty and its violations of human rights, like detention without trial, have been criticized by rightist leaders. On the other hand, the secularizing tendencies of successful modernization efforts are seen as a violation of Islamic tradition.

Because of the communal nature of the Malaysian political system, Islam functions as a divisive and not a unifying force. Beyond this, the fact that Malaysia's borders are the result of rather arbitrary decisions taken by the former colonial rulers presents unique problems of irredentism. The presence of Muslim minorities just across the borders in all three of Malaysia's non-Muslim neighbors makes developments in Malaysia all the more important.

In a geopolitical sense, Malaysia is the keystone of ASEAN. While developments in Indonesia will be of significance for the region, a fundamental shift in Malaysia's internal racial balance could easily destroy the fragile structure of ASEAN. Malaysia's tense borders are like fuses, each linked to the powder keg.

SINGAPORE: MALAYS AND THE RUGGED SOCIETY

Most central is the causeway frontier with the Chinese city-state of Singapore. In Singapore, the Malay population dates from before the establishment of the British colony by Thomas Stamford Raffles in 1819. There are also immigrants from adjacent areas of the Malaysian state of Johor and the Riau Islands to the south.

In a state dominated by Lee Kwan Yew's aggressively elitist and bureaucratic establishment, the "easy-going" Malays have seen their once bucolic *kampongs* (villages) engulfed, ghettoized and re-

developed in the space of two decades. The Teluk Belanga *kampong*, below Fraser's Hill, once the site of the Temenggong's residence (the Malay chief who sold Singapore to Raffles), was bulldozed to make room for shopping arcades and tourist hotels. Under the complex lies one of the truly historic Malay cemeteries of the island.¹⁰

By 1970, Geylang Serai, the largest Malay settlement in Singapore, and many other Malay and Chinese villages scattered around the island had become eyesores in Lee's "clean, green Singapore." Settlements located along major highways (especially en route from the tourist hotels to the airport) were camouflaged by hedgerows and fences. Meanwhile, the bulldozers slowly tear away at the red lateritic hills, leveling them to provide more room for the spartan concrete slabs.

Public housing in Singapore has received high marks from some urban developers, but conditions for their inhabitants are often less than ideal.¹¹ Poorer villagers whose former homes have been converted into \$1,000-per-square-foot real estate find themselves herded into one-room concrete "cells." Communities are destroyed as Chinese, Indians and Malays are indiscriminately mixed in public housing estates. As an ethnic community, the Malays of Singapore are being quietly but ruthlessly amalgamated into the "rugged society."

Malay education is also on the decline, and upwardly mobile Malays send their children to English schools. While Malay remains one of the official languages of Singapore, since 1965 the number of Malay schools has sharply declined.

The connections between the Malays of Singapore and Malays across the causeway in south Johor are numerous. Many families, both Malay and Chinese, are divided by the increasingly rigid border that has sprung up between the territories since 1965. Some Malays have bought land in Johor and moved out of Singapore; others have found a place in Singaporean society; but the less fortunate are slowly being herded into high-rises by Lee's bulldozers.

Malays in Singapore have essentially the same status as blacks, Hispanics and native Americans in the United States. They represent a dilemma for the Malays of Malaysia. On the one hand, they must maintain amicable relations with Lee to preserve the unity of ASEAN; on the other, the decline of the Singapore Malays stands as a grim reminder of the Malays' worst fears. The UMNO leadership would probably prefer the quiet disappearance of the Singapore Malays. Yet it will be difficult for Kuala Lumpur to "stand idly by" if they do not disappear.

Naturally, leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore are well aware of the potentially explosive communal situation on which their respective governments rest. As long as Lee and Hussein can quietly settle affairs

¹⁰Even Chinese landmarks are not sacred to the Singapore government. Note the series of articles in *FEER* regarding the destruction of a Chinese temple near a public housing development. "Bulldozers Challenge a God's Devotees," October 6, 1978, p. 20; "Postponing the Day of Doom," October 20, 1978, p. 26; and "Cleanliness before Godliness," November 17, 1978, p. 26.

¹¹While actual living conditions inside Singapore's public housing estates have rarely been described in print, a recent letter in the *FEER* gives an irate inside view. The letter is from "Justice Called Hazy Objective," *FEER*, April 13, 1979, p. 3.

on the golf course and trade information about dissidents on either side of the border, problems can be defused. Recent studies show that the ASEAN elites are developing very close relationships,¹² but as they coalesce, they risk drawing further away from their constituents. Succession disputes cloud the future of all five ASEAN states. Any change of leadership is a potential threat.

THAILAND: MUSLIM SEPARATISM

The Thai-Malay border is an area of serious tension, combining elements of Islamic fundamentalism, irredentism and Maoist insurgency. The Malayo/Muslims of the Kelantan-Patani border area are a people separated from the mainstream culture of their respective states; they are actually one people who were at one time politically affiliated. Here dialect similarities and family connections span the border. Until 1910, the entire region was under loose Siamese suzerainty. In that year, the four southern states (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu) were taken under British protection and detached from the Siamese state. The fugitive claimant to the old Patani sultanate maintains a court-in-exile in Kelantan.

Relations between the Muslims of the Patani region (including Yala and Narathiwat) and the Buddhist Thai have always been strained. Fewer than half the inhabitants of the region speak Thai. The Thai police garrison the region, but they do not control it; armed uprisings have been frequent and banditry is common. The most recent large-scale uprising, led by Haji Sulong, took place after World War II.¹³

Since the violent demonstrations in Patani in 1975 and 1976, Patani separatists have once again been trying to organize a rebellion. An effort is currently being made by the newly organized Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to resolve differences among the various rebel groups. The deteriorating economy of the region, once the second richest area in Thailand, may add fuel to the fire.¹⁴

The situation is further complicated by the presence of insurgents belonging to the Malayan Communist party (MCP), who move freely across the heavily jungled border and frequently seek sanctuary from Malaysian Army patrols in Thailand. To sup-

press the MCP, the Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok governments have launched many joint operations in the area, but these are usually ineffective and often result in the mistreatment of villagers.

Cooperation with the Malaysian government has limited Bangkok's freedom of action with regard to its own Muslims. The severe repression of all signs of Malayo/Muslim identity—a policy that was attempted by Field Marshal Phibun in the war years and is still favored by many Thai—would incense the Kelantanese and would probably force the Malaysian government to adopt a very hard line. The reunion of Patani with Kelantan has long been a major plank of the PMIP/PAS platforms.

As it stands today, the situation is in delicate balance. A resurgence of Islam in Malaysia could easily bring about a shift in Kuala Lumpur's relationship with Bangkok, which would be disastrous for ASEAN. On the other hand, Thailand has more serious problems elsewhere. Refugees pouring across the Laotian and Cambodian borders with hostile, Vietnamese-backed armies behind them pose more serious threats. And, the increasing power of the Thai Communist party (TCP) is another threat. One of the main TCP strongholds is just to the north of the Patani region in Songkla and Trang.

The ethnic and ideological differences among the various separatist and insurgent groups in southern Thailand and northern Malaysia have thus far kept resistance fragmented, although there have been continuing rumors of unification. Recently the MCP was reported to have recruited several hundred Malays, claiming they were working for "Islamic socialism."¹⁵

The question of Islamic socialism touches the deepest fears of the entrenched elites in both Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. An analysis of the role of the PMIP in Kelantan suggests that instead of being simply a fanatical and reactionary movement it is a defender of the class interests of the Muslim peasants. Given the strength of the dakwah and ABIM, there is a real possibility that the rural and urban movements may merge. As one Malaysian leader recently put it, "All we need is an Ayatollah Khomeini."

PHILIPPINES: MUSLIM GUERRILLAS

The most serious threat to ASEAN lies several thousand miles to the southeast of Patani, on Malaysia's border with the Philippines. The civil war between the Muslims of the southern Philippines and

(Continued on page 181)

¹²Robert O. Tillman, "Malaysia, Singapore and ASEAN: The Communications Functions of a Multi-National Organization," paper delivered at Malay World Symposium, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, May 5, 1979.

¹³Astri Suhrke, "Loyalists and Separatists: the Muslims in Southern Thailand," *Asian Survey*, March, 1977, pp. 237-250.

¹⁴Ho Kwon Ping, "Thailand's Broken Rice Bowl," *FEER*, December 1, 1978, p. 42. Ho quotes a recent World Bank report that describes the Muslim provinces as "very depressed." The average income of southern farmers is 25 percent below the national average and maize yields are 65 percent below the average for the central region.

¹⁵Shaplen, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

Carl A. Trocki is the author of *Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784-1885* (Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 1979). He has spent more than ten years living and working in various parts of Southeast Asia as a teacher, scholar and journalist.

"... the Arab-African diplomatic alliance has witnessed increasing strains, with African states painfully aware that they face a new political-economic dependence on the oil-rich states. [In Africa] Muslim states are favored by Arab largesse."

Islamic Affinities and International Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa

BY JON KRAUS

Associate Professor of Political Science; State University of New York/Fredonia

ISLAM plays an important role in sub-Saharan African politics at several levels. First, in the national and sub-national political arenas, Islam receives political expression in those countries where Muslims constitute a large proportion of the population, especially those that bridge north and sub-Saharan Africa. These states include Somalia (97 percent Muslim), the Sudan (70 percent), Chad (47-50 percent), Niger (87 percent), Nigeria (47 percent), Mali (60 percent), Guinea (65 percent), Senegal (80 percent), and Mauritania (99 percent). However, other important factors decisively influence the character of Islamic social forces and the importance of Islamic beliefs, traditions and law in national politics.

Among these factors are the pre-colonial strength and structure of distinctive Muslim political institutions, which were powerful, and remained so, in the Sudan and in northern Nigeria; the impact of colonial rule upon post-independence national political cultures, which has often led African leaders to emphasize the secular nature of the state; the degree of ethnic and racial cleavages in the society, and their effect on religious cleavages; the strength of the tie with the Arab Middle East, which has been strong in the Sudan and Somalia but involves memories of the slave trade in many other areas of East Africa; and the distinctive character of Islam in different parts of Africa.

A second level at which Islam has been important is diplomatic: the international relations of sub-Saharan African states with the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East. In the late 1950's and early 1960's this included Egypt's attempts to expand its influence in sub-Saharan Africa and common anti-colonial interests and membership in the Afro-Asian conferences and the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations. For similar reasons, all the North African states and Egypt became members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

However, Muslim Arab and African state interrelationships became far more important and intense as a result of two factors. The growing desire of the Arab

states to gain the support of African states in their conflict with Israel led them to increase their ties in order to undercut the relationships Israel was establishing. And the sudden rise to great wealth and effective power of the oil-exporting Arab states increased the determination of some states to employ petrodollars to attract African states to the anti-Israeli cause and to expand their own power or the influence of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, many African states faced enormous increases in oil prices, which dramatically worsened their economies and laid them open to the financial and diplomatic blandishments of the newly rich Arab states. The diplomatic quid pro quo for African support for the Arab world's anti-Israeli position was Arab support for the Africans against the remaining white-dominated regimes in southern Africa. African states also joined the successful Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and for a while accepted OPEC leadership in demands pressed against Western countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

The new wealth of Arab states has in important respects altered the political balance of power in the Middle East and in international politics, opening new economic aid possibilities and political options for African states. Moreover, some oil-rich Arab states have pursued their political, economic and religious goals by direct and sometimes violent interventions in the domestic politics of African states; witness Libya's use of arms, money and military power. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf state allies, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, have deployed their wealth to support more conservative or less hostile political forces in African states in order to offset and reduce the power of the Arab radical nationalists. In exchange for aid, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf state allies have also bluntly and energetically demanded that Islamic political groups be permitted freer rein or that Islamic beliefs be more vigorously expressed in social and political life. Moreover, Arab country aid has been directed overwhelmingly to Muslim states, thus politicizing religion in Arab-African relationships.

Recent events in the Middle East, especially the militant anti-Western Islam of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, have apparently not stirred the resurgence of Muslim social forces in sub-Saharan Africa. However, a few African states like the Sudan and Chad have discovered that the Arab states try to compel or induce domestic political environments more conducive to Islamic political forces and beliefs. Islamic expressions of political power—in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Chad—involve the continued politicizing of ethnic-religious cleavages or regime orientations, animated by the social power of Muslim groups and their not unwarranted desire to secure an equitable share in national power, status and resources.

In sub-Saharan countries whose population is largely Muslim, local and national politics is often influenced or shaped by Muslim social forces and, less frequently, by Islamic faith or law. However, many factors sharply reduce the impact of specifically Muslim groups or the Islamic religion on local or national politics. Where Islamic political and social institutions were well established prior to colonial rule, they often retained much of their power and even expanded it. Thus, the Hausa-Fulani Islamic emirates established in northern Nigeria by a jihad in the early nineteenth century and the Khatmiyya and Ansar Sufi sects in the Sudan were able to retain their power during colonial rule and to employ their traditional authority. They created political parties in the closing stage of colonial rule and today they play important post-independence political roles. But where Muslim peoples lived under African state or tribal systems, Islamic systems were often eroded by the colonial power, and ethnic or tribal interests were often more important. Thus in Guinea, Niger, Somalia and Mali, the absence of specifically Islamic state or political institutions drastically reduced the subsequent political significance of Islam.

In addition, almost all new African states comprise societies that are profoundly divided by ethnic and frequently, religious cleavages. The African nationalist leaders of the 1950's and 1960's realized that they had to overcome ethnic-religious cleavages and group solidarities, to create a united front against colonial rule and to create a nationalist basis of loyalty to new national political institutions. Certainly, ethnic and religious loyalties were employed by nationalist parties to garner political support. But the very ease with which traditional ethnic and (less so) religious cleavages could become politicized obliged national political leaders to emphasize the illegitimacy of ethnic-religious cleavages as a basis for political participation.

Moreover, nationalist leaders, invariably drawn from the ranks of those who had attended modern schools in the colonies and universities abroad, had

absorbed secular European ideology and institutions. The French and British government and party models (excepting the French Christian Democrats) were perceived to have relatively little to do with ethnicity or religion. Of course in countries that were predominantly Muslim, like Guinea (65 percent) and Mali (60 percent), during the nationalist period nationalist party leaders emphasized the Muslim (indigenous) character of its leaders; in Guinea the party celebrated the nineteenth century Muslim military leader, Samoury Touré, who had resisted French colonial armies in the name of Islam. But these same leaders were often strongly influenced by aspects of colonial culture: Sekou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali, both of whom traced their lineage to prominent Muslim leaders, were primarily influenced in their political thought by French marxism; Leopold Sedar Senghor in Senegal, a Catholic in an 80 percent Muslim country, was profoundly influenced by French culture, its language (he was grammarian of the French National Assembly), and French socialist and Catholic action thought. These leaders were not interested in sustaining the power of religious and traditional leaders, whose beliefs and power were often perceived as impediments to secular party organization and national economic development, the very secular holy grail of many African governments.

ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA

In addition, it is probable that in most areas of West Africa Islam does not always reflect Islam in North Africa and the Middle East. Amadou Hampaté Ba, a Malian Muslim, has noted that in West Africa Islam "takes on a much less combative and aggressive tone" than in the Middle East, although West Africa has not been without its Muslim holy wars, which in the nineteenth century contributed to its expansion in Senegal and northern Nigeria. Islam spread rapidly in the countries of West Africa by accommodating indigenous religious beliefs and practices so long as they did not conflict with Islam. Historically much Muslim penetration occurred gradually and peacefully through Muslim traders and the adoption of Islam by African chiefs or kings who accepted the greater efficacy of Muslim prayer and magic. Islam has frequently won converts not by imposing itself in a militant fashion but by not requiring converts to observe all the obligations, fasts and prayers, although converts must send their children to Koranic school.

African Muslims have retained ties to the Middle East, particularly through those who have studied at Egypt's al-Azhar University and returned to their communities as learned men (about 1,000 of the 31,000 students at al-Azhar in 1973-1974 came from sub-Saharan Africa). But West Africa has not been greatly influenced by the waves of reformist Islam that

have periodically swept the Middle East. The African country with perhaps the closest ties is the Sudan in northwest Africa, where a militant reformist Islam arose in the Mahdist movement in the 1880's to drive out an oppressive Egyptian occupying army.

The overwhelming political preoccupation of African political leaders has been to hold their political communities together while consolidating their political power, to reduce the political influence of social cleavages so that these cleavages did not challenge the new political systems. Some African political leaders and parties have been much more successful in this enterprise than others. Senegal and Nigeria are states where Islam has not been a major source of political conflict (though the same may not be said of ethnic cleavages). Uganda under Idi Amin is an example of how the unholy exploitation of ethnic-religious cleavages on behalf of a small Muslim minority contributed to bloody mayhem and the virtual destruction of a society. And the Sudan, Chad and Ethiopia are countries in which the refusal of political leaders to recognize the rights of large ethnically and religiously distinct communities has precipitated civil wars. In the Chad and Ethiopian-Eritrean cases, other Muslim states came to the aid of Muslim insurgents, primarily on the basis of religion.

Senegal, 80 percent Muslim, is unique in West Africa in possessing extremely powerful tariqas, or brotherhoods, elsewhere called sufi sects. There are three large and important tariqas in Senegal—the Tijaniyya, of which there are several groups, the Muridiyya, second in number of adherents but the most influential, and the Qadiriyya. Expressions of a reformist Islam, the tariqas acquired adherents and power in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the face of the disintegration of Wolof society. The Muslim marabus, or religious leaders, succeeded the Wolof chiefs and aristocracy in authority, forming cohesive and powerful orders in which they enjoyed enormous religious-political and economic authority over their followers or taalibés (disciples). Despite some tariqa leaders' strong resistance to French colonialism, the brotherhoods and their leaders became increasingly conservative and exploitive in extracting wealth from their followers.

Leopold Senghor's efforts to make the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS) the dominant nationalist party in Senegal were strengthened by his alliances with important marabus, the most important being the caliph or chief marabu, of the Muridiyya. Subsequently the conservatism of the wealthy, land-owning marabus forced the UPS to mute many of its progressive policies. While not formal political leaders, the leading marabus are

among the most prominent political men in Senegal; their ability to extract funds and programs from the government has contributed to the corruption of Senegal's political elite, which has driven younger reformers and radicals out of the UPS. The agricultural dominance of the marabus led the government to run its agricultural program through the brotherhoods. Splits among marabus led some marabus to support opposition parties, as some Tijaniyya marabus did unsuccessfully in 1959-1961, and the marabus have been able to compel reversal of some government policies (e.g., a tariff on the peanut crop in 1965-1966) and to ignore others.¹ However, political support is not narrowly contingent upon religion, for most marabus supported the Catholic Président Senghor against the Muslim Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in their 1962 power struggle. And the UPS is by no means wholly dependent on the brotherhoods and has dealt toughly with marabus who directly challenged its authority. In the late 1970's, Senghor ended the single-party system in Senegal; an amendment to the constitution permitted two opposition parties. But when Muslim notables tried to form an Islamic party, their leader was placed on trial in late 1979 for violating the constitutional provision against any explicit political reference to religion.

Because of its highly organized, powerful emirates (Islamic states) and rich Hausa-Fulani Muslim culture, northern Nigeria boasted the greatest inheritance of Islamic power among sub-Saharan African states. The Islamic emirates, born of the 1804 jihad and led by a Fulani aristocracy that adopted the culture of the Hausa people it conquered, retained much of their institutional power as agents of British colonial rule. Although the Fulani aristocracy (and to a lesser degree the emirates themselves) were able to retain overwhelming authority in northern Nigeria by adapting traditional institutions to party politics during the terminal stage of colonial rule, two major considerations depoliticized Islam in national and to a lesser degree regional Nigerian politics. First, in the north, which has a majority of the population and is predominantly Muslim, there are non-Hausa-Fulani Muslim peoples and (in the Middle Belt) Christians and animists. To attract support from non-Hausa-Fulani peoples for a common position to advance the north's interests against a more developed, politically organized, and nationalist south, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) was consciously non-sectarian. Second, the southern peoples (predominantly Yoruba and Ibo) are largely non-Muslim and historically resisted the encroachments of emirate power. Thus Nigeria's population (now about 80 million), was unified in a federation in which the largest ethnic groups dominated state power and the NPC shared national power in a coalition with southern parties (1960-1966) that rejected Muslim connotations.

¹See Lucy Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), chapters 4-6.

NPC interests, like those of the northern parties that succeeded the NPC after 13 years of military rule (1966-1979), emphasized the need to increase the underdeveloped north's share of government resources and positions in education, the civil service, military and commerce in order to avoid the domination of the educationally and economically more developed south. In political power struggles in Nigeria, critical social cleavages are usually ethnic and regional. The Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani perceive themselves as culturally distinct, a perception heightened by political conflict over scarce resources and power. But even in the 1967-1970 civil war, when ethnicity became highly polarized, the Ibos denounced "reactionary Hausa-Fulani domination," not Islam.

The Fulani aristocracy ensured its dominance in the NPC and the northern region, whose first premier was the Sardauna of Sokoto, although its power in the north has been weakened by the creation of new states, some of which are controlled by other northern groups. Hausa-Fulani power declined somewhat during the period of military rule. Although southern officer dominance in the military was ended by the second coup of 1966 and the ethnic killings in the military, which drove out the Ibo, non-Hausa-Fulani northerners predominated in the military at the commissioned and noncommissioned officer levels. But Hausa-Fulani officers easily accepted Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon as a northern leader and as head of the military and of the state after the July, 1966, northern counter coup, although Gowon was from a minority tribe (the Agba) and a devout Christian.

The political struggle for power was highly competitive and intense in Nigeria during 1978-1979, as political leaders skirmished for power in the new civilian government that succeeded military rule in October, 1979. The north ensured its traditional power structures through the creation of a local government system that varies by local area and (in the north) possesses elective features and a preeminent role for traditional leaders. One of the few major disputes surrounding the new constitution involved the exodus and brief boycott by northern delegates of the constituent assembly when it failed to approve a federal Shari'a (Muslim law) Appeals Court. While the 1979 elections indicated the continued role of ethnic voting, they also demonstrated the relative insignificance of religious cleavages. The National party of Nigeria (NPN), which won a plurality of federal House and Senate seats, governorships and the presidency, had the broadest support of any party. At its core were the Hausa-Fulani states of the north, some Middle Belt northern areas, and non-Ibo areas in the southeast; and the NPN showed substantial support in many other areas as well. Once again, the

federal government involves a coalition of parties. The greatest policy impact of Islam probably flows from its contribution to the conservative and hierarchical character of northern society, which its Hausa-Fulani leaders represent at the national level.

UGANDA AND THE EXPLOITATION OF RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGES

Uganda lies in East Africa at the language-cultural juncture of the Bantu, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanese population groups, where centralized Bantu kingdoms, especially Buganda, have been dominant. Before Idi Amin's coup in 1971, Uganda's complicated politics involved a political tug of war between the separatist desires of the Buganda state (which acquired a privileged federal status) and the very idea of a Ugandan nation, championed by non-Buganda ethnic alliances. Christian religious cleavages were highly politicized; the important parties had both ethnic and religious aspects, despite the fact that most ethnic groups were of diverse religious adherence. The primary conflict was between those identified with Protestant (28 percent of population) and Catholic (49 percent) parties; the Muslims (5.6 percent) were a neglected minority in the northern areas, bordering the Sudan and Zaire.

Prime Minister (then President) Milton Obote mortgaged his political future to the army when he used it first to subdue the powerful Buganda state in 1965-1966 and then to repress dissidents in his own and opposition parties. A mutiny over pay in 1964 did not lead to disciplinary measures for the unruly army; and the rapid Africanization of the officer corps continued. Obote's rapid buildup of the military in the mid-and late-1960's involved the manipulation by Obote and his new commander, General Idi Amin, of recruitment from their personal areas of ethnic support to ensure army loyalty to themselves—Obote drawing on the Nilotic Langi and Acholi and Amin drawing on the Sudanic Kakwa and related groups. Officer promotion was also manipulated.

Idi Amin's seizure of power in early 1972 was apparently animated by a conflict with Obote; the coup, undertaken with a small section of the army, did not give Amin control of the army. Amin's control was solidified over the next months and years by the systematic and brutal murder of all Langi and Acholi officers and men in the army, because they might support Obote. Amin administered an increasingly lawless society and army and security apparatus, which he ruled by force and by terror, exploiting inter-ethnic differences in a cunning and murderous fashion.

Amin recruited top military and civilian leaders increasingly from his own Kakwa ethnic group and from the West Nile District in an attempt to ensure their loyalty. More important, he undertook to build

up the army and security apparatus by recruiting largely from Uganda's Muslim Nubians and related (but non-Muslim) southern Sudanese as well as other non-Ugandans. Of 15,000 left in the army in 1977-1978, it was estimated that 3,000 were southern Sudanese, another 4,000-5,000 came from Amin's West Nile District, primarily Kakwa and Nubians. Of the 22 top military commanders in 1977-1978, 13 were from Amin's West Nile District, seven of them Kakwa, including the highest ranking; four were Southern Sudanese, two others Nubians, and only three from other tribes; 17 of the 22 were Muslim. The governors of provinces and senior military officers were virtually all Muslim and West Nilers.² The army and security apparatus that subsequently ruled Ugandans resembled an alien and mercenary occupation force, distinct from virtually all Ugandans in language, culture, religion and regional origins. Amin's military promotions and civilian appointments pursued an overwhelming bias toward Muslims, Nubians, his own Kakwa people, and the Lugbara, a policy that alienated and distressed the country's Christian majority. The regime's indiscriminate killings and ethnic-religious biases prompted repeated desperate plots and assassination attempts against Amin: after such an attempt in June, 1977, by Buganda and Busoga officers, the Anglican Archbishop and other Busoga officers were murdered.

Soviets, Palestinians, and Nubians constituted Amin's personal security force and presidential guard. The Soviets along with the Libyans provided the major sources of military equipment and aid, while various Arab states responded to Amin's proclaimed devotion to Islam and the Palestinian cause by providing a significant amount of economic aid (although Amin dismissed Uganda's Grand Mufti, head of the Islamic community, in a dispute over how to dispose of Arab-country aid).

The Amin regime fell in April, 1979, under a counterattack launched by the Tanzanian army, aided by Ugandan exiles, following Uganda's invasion of Tanzania in October, 1978. But Amin's defeat had been slowed by continued Arab economic aid and an estimated 2,000-3,000 Libyan troops and fresh arms sent by Libya's Colonel Muammar el Qaddafi in March. The economic, social and political devastation that Amin visited on Uganda cannot, of course, be attributed to Islam. But the readiness of Muslim states, radical and conservative, to discover in Amin's pro-Muslim policies a source of religious solidarity and their willingness to give him external support enabled Amin to act more ruthlessly against all Ugandans.

There are at least three political dimensions of

²See Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-78* (New York: African Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 3442, 3447.

Islam in the Sudan: the socioeconomic and political power of the major Muslim tariqas or Muslim brotherhoods; the attempts of the Muslim Arab and Arabized people and the central government and Muslim brotherhoods to impose Arabic and Islam on the African, partly Christian and mostly animist peoples of the three southern provinces (which resulted in large-scale oppression and civil war during 1963-1972); and the conflict for political power between the more secular (but equally Muslim) groups, including urban middle class organizations, the Communist party, and Gaafar Nimeiri's military regime (1969-), and the major Muslim brotherhoods.

The Sudan is a huge, extremely poor country with a highly heterogeneous population of about 17 million people. Roughly 40 percent of the people consider themselves Arabs and some two-thirds profess Islam, although Arab intermixture with Africans and the looseness of adherence to Islam (which has a higher status than local religions) make such numbers rough. These people, ethnically differentiated and located in the center, west, and north of the Sudan, are culturally and linguistically distinct from the wholly African one-fourth of the population that lives in the three southern provinces. Whereas the Arab peoples have some cultural unity and have been dominant in all major social institutions in recent history, until recently the African peoples have had no such unity, except that in the south they share a profound aversion to and distrust of the Arabs, whom they identify with the slave trade, which continued up to the beginning of this century.

Two major forces have dominated Islam in the Sudan since the nineteenth century. The first is the Ansar, the organization of Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi, who drove the Egyptians and the British from the Sudan in 1885 and established the Mahdiyyah, an Islamic theocratic state, which was defeated by British and Egyptian forces in 1898. A central feature of al-Ansar, which is now a tariqa with millions of followers, is its devotion to its founder, whose grandson, former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, is the current leader. The second is the Khatmiyya brotherhood, warred upon by al-Mahdi, which returned to the Sudan with the British and Egyptians and has always been headed by the al-Mirghani family. This also requires rigorous devotion to the founder's heirs.

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Jon Kraus has frequently undertaken research in West Africa. His most recent publications include "The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in Ghana," in Ukandi Dimachi and Lester Trachtman, eds., *Industrial Relations in Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1978) and "Strikes and Labor Power in a Post-Colonial African State," *Development and Change* (April, 1979).

"Today's pro-Arab ambience in the world . . . generates a universal reluctance to antagonize Muslims. This is all the more true since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, because the two world blocs cater to Muslim nations in order to attract them to their cause. Thus countries with sizable Muslim minorities will probably make an effort to liberalize their minority policy. . . ."

Muslim Minorities under Non-Islamic Rule

BY RAPHAEL ISRAELI

Lecturer in Chinese History and Islamic Civilization, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

A contemporary authority in Islamic studies, Fazlur Rahman, worded the inexorable linkage between Islam and politics in one succinct sentence: "Islam, like communism, insists on assumption of political power, as the will of God has to be worked on earth by a political system."¹ No wonder, then, that Muslims are required (and as a rule strive) to live in a Muslim state. The minorities that fail to do so face very serious problems of identity, which at times end in crisis and unrest.*

Muslims everywhere are aware that they belong to the universal ecclesia of Islam, the Umma. At the same time, they lead a way of life that is bound to alienate them from their environment and engender suspicion from (and at times confrontation with) the host culture. Suspicion creates fear, and confrontation generates hostility, all the more so when Muslim minorities constitute either a local majority or a very substantial portion of the population in their host countries, thus exacerbating cultural hostility by adding economic competition and the threat of rebellion and secession.

From the viewpoint of the host society, if it can neither assimilate the minority nor drive it out, theoretically it must subjugate the minority or exterminate it. Muslim minority responses hinge not only on the inherent incompatibility between Islamic and non-Islamic rule but also on the treatment meted out by the majority culture. When the Muslim minority is weak but the socio-political environment is liberal (like the United States), then pluralism is usually advocated by the Muslims, who thereby hope to win an existence on an equal footing with the majority. Under more oppressive regimes (like the Soviet or Chinese), the Muslim minorities are more likely to adopt the "assimilationist" course, that is, material acculturation into the host culture, while the core of the faith and community cohesion are kept intact.

*The author thanks his research assistant, Carol Bardenstein, for her help in collecting the materials used in this article.

¹Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979), introduction.

²Maudoodi, *Nationalism in India*, pp. 5-11.

Indeed, the Muslim calendar, Muslim festivals, dietary laws, customs of worship, and so on inhibit anything more than a superficial assimilation.

The other possible responses of the Muslim minority are secessionism and militancy, and the two are often interrelated. When minority Muslims are frustrated by the unworkability of a pluralistic society (the U.S.S.R.'s "Republics," Cyprus, the Philippines), Muslims often become antagonistic, especially when the majority transgresses the limits of uneasy coexistence and moves toward outright subjugation or physical elimination. In such cases, the quest for secession from the "abode of war" and reunion with the universal "pax Islamica" can generate rebellion, which (if successful) strives to attain political and cultural independence (Cyprus and the Philippines). Militancy entails more extremism than secessionism. A militant Muslim minority not only seeks political and cultural autonomy, but also strives to dominate others, confident of its own superiority. (See the recent case of Idi Amin's regime in Uganda.) The classic instance of militancy and secession is found in Muslim history in Hindu India. Conquering Islam had subjugated Hinduism and ruled the subcontinent. But when Muslim power was eroded by the British, Islam sought and achieved separation from the Hindus rather than submitting to the democratic rule of modern India that would have allowed the Hindus to exercise political domination over the Muslims. And when the majority of Indian Muslims established their own state (Pakistan), the ulama spoke of the reinstitution of the shari'a as the state law. There was no alternative to this arrangement, if one bears in mind the fact that Islam is inconsistent with other political ideologies. Maulana Maudoodi, the prominent Indian Muslim modernist, has put it this way:

To be a Muslim and adopt a non-Islamic viewpoint is only meaningless. "Muslim Nationalist" and "Muslim Communist" are as contradictory terms as "Communist Fascist" and "chaste prostitute."²

Thus as orthodox Muslims see it, Islam is ideally an either-or affair. Either Islamic law and institutions are

given full expression and dominate state life or, failing that, if the state is non-Islamic, Muslims should try to reverse the situation or leave. In practice, however, things are not so clear-cut. As long as an appearance of peace and accommodation can be maintained, the minority Muslim community, although entertaining a vague hope for the fulfillment of its political aspirations at some future time, can contain the discrepancy between reality and dream, and the tension between the two can go unresolved. But if persecution is intensified to the point where no real Muslim life can be ensured and if the practical opportunity arises, the minority Muslims are likely to seize it and proclaim either a separate Muslim entity or a Muslim state regardless of whether the Muslim population is a majority or a minority in the territory in question. For an Islamic state can encompass either. Muslims have experienced both a Muslim majority under non-Muslim rule as in Christian Valencia where Muslims outnumbered the Christians four to one,³ and a Muslim minority-rule in Hindu-majority India. It is Muslim rule, then, that defines the borders of the Abode of Islam, not Muslim minorities or majorities.

Let us illustrate these generalizations in China, Israel and Cyprus, particularly in the light of the current fundamentalist wave of Islam. These host countries illustrate the plight of minority Muslims under atheistic, Jewish and Christian rule, respectively.

THE MUSLIM (HUI) MINORITY IN CHINA

The Muslim settlement in China dates back to the eighth century, and it underwent many vicissitudes in pre-modern times. Suffice it to say that by the eighteenth century, at the height of the Ch'ing rule in China (1644-1911), the Muslim community was strong enough to assert itself as one of China's recognized minority groups. However, unlike other minority groups, like the Mongols, the Tibetans and the Chuang, the Muslims in China are not attached to any particular territory, although they admittedly constitute a majority, or a very sizable minority, in areas of the northwest. They can be found everywhere in China, and every large city is likely to have its Hui section. Thus, the Muslim problem in China stems not only from the aggregate figure of 30 million-35 million⁴ all over China, but from their geodemographic distribution, which makes any solution within an "autonomous region" an exercise in futility.

Furthermore, unlike other minority groups, whose home base may be included in toto within the confines of China (e.g. Tibet, Manchuria), the Muslims,

³Robert L. Burns, *The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 303.

⁴There is much dispute about the figure. Estimates vary between 15 million and 80 million depending on the identity and political inclination of the author. 30 million and 35 million may be a fair assessment.

whose focus of identity remains with the universal Umma of Islam, regard themselves as a Chinese branch of an alien culture, not exactly a minority-guest culture in China. The daily validation of their membership in the Umma is at the basis of Muslim ritual, and one of the "Pillars of Islam" is the tenet of Hajj—the pilgrimage to Mecca, the holy place of all Muslims, the birthplace of the Prophet and of Islam. Nineteenth century China, which was marked by dynastic domestic decadence and by foreign incursions on its borders, witnessed a Muslim revival of unprecedented proportions, under the influence of fundamentalist moves that shook the Muslim world at that time. The ruling Manchu Dynasty condoned and at times even sanctioned the persecution of Muslims and other minorities, so much so that there was no escaping the course of collision on which both sides embarked. Indeed, during the nineteenth century, Muslim rebellions in China were rife, especially in the areas where Muslims constituted a majority of the population, and they threw many provinces into chaos. Unlike other rebellions, however, the Muslims did not want to take over the central rule in Peking or dismantle the dynasty; they were content to secede from the empire. One such heroic attempt was made by Tu wen-hsiu, a Yunannese Muslim who shrugged off the Chinese order and declared an independent Muslim state in his province (1856-1873). Although this adventure turned out to be an ephemeral episode, Tu's use of Muslim symbols like "Sultan Suleiman" and "Commander of the Faithful," and the Arabic language in some of his proclamations bear witness to the latent vitality of repressed minority Islam.

Under the Communist regime, China has clung to the idea of the state as a unitary body politic, a concept that has its roots in the traditional view of the universe—the T'ien-hsia—ruled by the Son of Heaven. Thus, unlike the Soviet Union, which has recognized (at least in theory) the acceptability of a Federation of Soviet Republics, many of which are populated by "minority" peoples, China has never budged from the traditional view that power emanates from the center; the center in turn, is, influenced by feedback from the masses below. In this setting, there is no room for political pluralism, although the Communist regime has taken cognizance of the cultural variety in China and has made serious attempts to recognize "minority nationalities" and to set up "autonomous regions."

From the 1950's onward, the radical line pursued in China with a view to communizing the economy and Mao-izing the sociopolitical behavior of the masses generated a head-on collision with the Muslim minority. Waqf (religious endowment) land belonging to the mosques was at times confiscated, and the educational system emphasized Marxism-Leninism-Maoism at the expense of Muslim customs and

traditions. This policy generated strong opposition on the part of the Muslims who remained, on the whole, dedicated to their Islamic values and to universal Islam. A Muslim imam who escaped from China reported a khutba (religious sermon) that he had delivered to his congregation during those tough days:

First, I outlined the historical facts of the struggles during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad and his final victory over tyrannical rule and evil powers. I entreated them to follow and to manifest the unconquerable and unflinching spirit of resistance of our ancestors.⁵

Moreover, in areas thickly populated by Muslims, where their self-confidence was compounded by overwhelming indignation, opposition to the Communist regime assumed a more violent character, to the point of open revolt.⁶

During the brief period of the "Hundred Flowers" (1956-1957), when open criticism was allowed, Muslims attacked the authority of the Communist party and the flood of Chinese migration into their areas, and some of them even demanded self-determination for their people in no uncertain terms. An official source acknowledged in 1958 that:

The meeting of the Kansu Nationalities Affairs Committee took the view that local nationalism among the Hui was not only widespread but also pronounced in Kansu. . . . Muslims denounced their fellow-Muslim Communist sympathizers as traitors to Hui nationality.⁷

Some Muslims discredited the fatherland concept cultivated by the regime, declaring that:

China is not the fatherland of the Hui nationality. . . . Arabic is the language of the Hui people. . . . All the Hui people of the world belong to one family. . . .⁸

Another official report revealed that:

The Hui declare that there is no living to be made in China, and even openly demanded emigration permits from the government so that they may return to Arabia to settle down. Some of them make it known that a government of *Imams* will be established within an Islamic state.⁹

In May, 1958, the *People's Daily* revealed that the Hui of Henan had twice revolted in 1953 and planned to establish an independent Islamic state. In April and June, 1958, another Muslim movement, led by Ma Chen-wu, a Hui imam from Ningxia, erupted into a revolt with the reported purpose of establishing a "Chinese Muslim Republic" under the war slogan "glory to Islam."

In the light (or obscurity, as may be one's world

⁵Kao Hao-Jen, *The Imam's Story* (Hong Kong, 1960), p. 14.

⁶Yang I-fan, *Islam in China* (Hong Kong), pp. 71-78.

⁷Dispatch of the New China News Agency, January 16, 1958. Cited by S. Ghosh, *Embers in Cathay* (New York: 1961), pp. 81-2.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

view) of the Iranian revolution, these terms sound a rather familiar ring. But in the Chinese context, when one looks back to the history of Chinese Islam, one is struck by the repetition of the same traditional themes under Imperial and Communist China. To wit, Arabia—the place of inception and operation of the Prophet and of the Faith—has remained in the Chinese Muslim ethos their true homeland, though neither they nor their forefathers had probably ever been there before. Their yearning is not merely to migrate to a land of safety, but to return to Arabia, as the only way for their physical and spiritual redemption. Similarly, the Arabic language, of which they know a mere trifle, has remained their language. For that is the tongue of the Prophet and the manifestation of the word of Allah as it descended to humanity in the Qur'an.

Despite these built-in tensions, there were times when the Communist regime ostensibly evinced benevolence towards its Muslim minority. The vacillations of China's policy toward the minorities in general and the Muslims in particular have been occasioned by dilemmas facing Beijing's policy-makers:

1. The inherent contradiction between Communist ideology, which had raised high hopes among the Muslims for a far-reaching self-determination, and the practical requirements of national interests that dimmed these hopes;
2. The built-in tension between foreign policy gestures toward the Islamic world and the demands of tough controls at home;
3. The acute contradiction between a crash integration program for the Muslims, which may give rise to resentment and uprising, and a policy of liberalization, which may encourage their secessionist propensities.

Past experience has shown that in modern China whenever Islam was oppressed to the point of jeopardizing its existence or when it was given enough leeway to express itself freely, voices of separatism came to the fore, at times violently. In order to avert Muslim uprisings in China, it is apparently necessary to maintain a precarious balance between a strong policy that does not encroach too bluntly on the cultural-religious viability of the Muslim community and a liberal and generous policy that remains short of virtual autonomy. Today, with the relatively liberal policy pursued by Deng Xiaoping and his followers and the promises of the new constitution to "give back to ethnic minorities the right to preserve or reform their own customs and ways," it remains to be seen whether there will be any new substance or whether this is a new exercise in rhetoric.

THE MUSLIM (ARAB) MINORITY OF ISRAEL

If the existence of a Muslim minority in a non-Muslim land is unenviable in general, how much more so in Israel, where the Arab Muslim minority

(about .5 million out of 3.5 million) is torn between loyalty to its homeland and commitment to its Arab people—Israel's enemy.

Although the Arab-Israeli conflict is not religious in origin, the Islamic residue and symbolism that have become part and parcel of Arab attitudes toward Israel are shared, to a large extent, by Israeli Arabs. This problem is even more acute for the Arab Muslims who populate the West Bank and Gaza, the territories administered by Israel since 1967. The Arabs see a fivefold grievance:

First, Israel gave shelter to the Jews, the Quranic "wretched people," who are obviously not a nation and are therefore not entitled to nationhood. According to this view, the very claim to a separate political entity constitutes an affront, as it were, to the holy tradition of Islam.

Second, the fact that Jews have been seeking refuge in Israel from lands of Islam defies and exposes to criticism the Arab/Muslim claim that the scriptuary peoples (Jews included) have always enjoyed equality and encountered benevolence under Islamic rule. The massive exodus of Jews from those lands and their flow to Israel belie Muslim claims of fair treatment of their dhimmis in their midst.

Third, those same Jews who had been condemned to "humiliation and misery" in the Holy Writings of Islam, have dared and succeeded (though vastly outnumbered) in defeating, once and again, the "elected nation of Allah."

Fourth, Palestine had been, almost uninterruptedly, part of the Abode of Islam since the seventh century, except for the brief interregnum of the Crusades. Thus, establishing a non-Muslim state in that part of the world is tantamount to snatching part of Muslim property and turning it into a territory of war. This act of robbery or usurpation, as the Arab Muslims would have it, is therefore compared to the Crusader Jerusalem Kingdom of the Middle Ages. According to the logic of history, Israel is, therefore, bound to become as ephemeral as the Crusader state had been. A jihad (holy war) remains, as was the case in the Middle Ages, the only way to retrieve the lost territories.

Fifth, if Palestine and other Arab territories are regarded as sacred, because they constitute part of the Islamic patrimony, Jerusalem is all the more so, because of its holy status in its own right, its place in Muhammad's biography and subsequent Islamic history.

These basic themes that are shared, in varying forms and intensities, by many Muslims across the globe have a direct bearing on the life of Palestinian Muslims. Even more than other Muslims who may feel resentment and frustration at their inability to reverse the situation, the Muslims living under Israeli rule sense the humiliation of being dominated by an erstwhile dhimmi nation with a questionable reputation in Islamic tradition.

Until 1967, the Muslim Arab minority in Israel was small in numbers and virtually isolated from the rest of the Arab Muslim world. Moreover, the Palestinian identity that was to gain prominence in subsequent

years was faint and almost unknown to Israeli Muslims in those days. The Muslim minority seemed resigned to its fate; either out of despair or out of pragmatic considerations, it gradually drifted toward a long-term acceptance of its status as a minority culture. The war of 1967 reversed all that, largely because of the direct contacts between Israeli Arabs and their brethren in the administered territories, and because of the mounting stature of Palestinian identity.

This new link was dramatically epitomized in the events of April, 1976, which came to be known as the "Day of the Land." What was to be a protest by the Arabs of the Galilee against what they regarded as "expropriation of their land" became political agitation, and the Arabs' desire to maintain control of their lands was overshadowed by the irredentist slogan, "we shall liberate you, O Galilee!" This outburst, which resulted in loss of life, was accompanied by concurrent large-scale demonstrations in the cities of Judea and Samaria, in support of the "oppressed brethren" in Israel proper. These disturbances were hailed throughout the Muslim world as an "uprising of the Palestinian people" on both sides of Israel's pre-1967 borders against "Israeli occupation."

This does not mean, of course, that all or most Israeli Arabs now side with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and have irreversibly relinquished their comfortable existence as a minority under Israeli-Jewish rule. As a matter of fact, many Israeli Arabs voiced their support of Israel and even rushed to help the Israeli authorities during the fateful days of October, 1973. However, under the impact of the war and the rise of Islam, increasing numbers of Israeli Arab youth are more inclined than before to throw in their lot with the Arab Muslim population of the territories under the unifying umbrella of a "Free Democratic Palestine." This euphemism signifies, of course, that although "Muslims, Christians and Jews could live in peace," Muslim Arab hegemony would be resumed while the Jews and Christians would be relegated to their previous status of dhimmis.

The current revival of Islam has further exacerbated an already difficult situation. Internationally, the alliance between the PLO's Yasir Arafat and Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has prompted a new turn of events further Islamizing the Arab-Israeli conflict, drawing Iranian Muslims as well as Arabs into daily and actual involvement in the conflict. Arafat's battlecry in Teheran, "Today Teheran, tomorrow Tel-Aviv," and his public embraces with Khomeini, illustrate this point. In Israel and in the administered territories, more mosques are being built than ever before; more and more hitherto alienated youth are finding their way back into Islam; and a group of Muslim sheiks has been pressing for the founding of an Islamic college in Israel. Similarly, in

the West Bank and Gaza, Islam has become a refuge for the frustrated Arabs who refuse to continue to live under Israeli occupation. The Muslim leadership (the Supreme Islamic Council) in the territories has been cultivating the virtue of persistence (*sabr*) in the face of adverse conditions, and occasionally incites a spiritual jihad as a purgatory process. In January, 1979, a leaflet was distributed in Nablus urging believers to "join the Great Islamic Revolution that has been taking place in other lands of Islam"; and in January, 1980, extremist Muslim groups were reported creating disturbances in the Gaza area.

To sum up, the Arab Muslim population of Israel and the Arabs in the Administered Territories have gradually drawn closer together, under the impact of Islamic revival and the impelling conditions of rising Palestinian nationalism and mounting Arab and Islamic confidence as a result of the Yom Kippur War. To contain this politically minded population under Israeli-Jewish rule as a minority devoid of national rights seems to have become Mission Impossible. Unless some sort of autonomy or self-rule can be devised and accepted by the Arab Muslims in the territories, no lasting settlement can be envisaged. No such solution would be acceptable to the PLO and the Arab Rejectionists, in any case. Therefore a reconciliation between Israel and its Arab population, in pre-1967 borders (half a million) and in the Administered Territories (another million), depends largely on the ability and willingness of this population to disagree with the other Arab Muslims who show no desire to see the conflict recede. Such a prospect seems dim and remote.

THE MUSLIM (TURKISH) MINORITY OF CYPRUS

Somewhat like the Arabs of Israel, the Turkish Muslim minority in Cyprus owes its allegiance to a motherland (Turkey) that lies outside the confines of its own territory; but unlike Muslims in Israel (who would like to see the Jewish state revert to the Abode of Islam in its entirety), Cypriot Muslims would rather secede from their Christian compatriots, who themselves strive for a Hellenistic Cyprus (*Taksim* versus *Enosis*).

The basic division of allegiance between the two parts of the Cypriot population is deepened by historical, ethnic, religious and linguistic stumbling blocks that keep those two groups apart. The Greeks of the island identify with the Hellenistic past, while the Turks are direct descendants of the Ottoman conquerors; the Greeks adhere to the Greek Orthodox Church, while the Muslims follow Sunni Islam; the Greeks speak a local Greek dialect, while the Turks speak Turkish; the Greeks read Greek books and maintain a Greek curriculum in their schools while

the Turks read and study Turkish books; Greeks and Turks live in separate quarters or even separate villages; Greeks view the Turks as intruders and barbarians, the Turks regard the Greeks as cowards and selfish. Each of them considers its own group as a superior and more civilized race and looks down on the other.

Thus, the current struggle between the two groups, which echoes the historical struggle between Islam and Christianity in the Mediterranean and is intensified by nationalistic sentiments makes the very idea of Cypriotism or local nationalism impractical. Even the magic word of self-determination cannot resolve the problem. "Self-determination" for whom? The Greeks would interpret it as the democratic rule of the majority; the Turks would claim that the enactment of democracy in the Western sense would perpetuate their domination by the Greek majority.

When Cyprus became independent in 1960, the Turkish minority (about 20 percent out of 600,000) was to share power with the majority, and the leader of the Turkish population held the office of Vice President. But the Turks soon realized that they were relegated to a secondary role by virtue of their minority status in the general population, which viewed advancement on the political ladder as a function of ascriptive not achievement-oriented yardsticks. In other words, despite the similitude of democracy (which it was), united Cyprus under Makarios was a political system of ethnic communities and quotas rather than an open meritocracy.

Forced to choose between reconciling themselves to what they viewed as a servile second place in a Christian-dominated system or revolting, the Muslim Turks revolted. In fact, they had little choice, since Cyprus had been turned into a virtual Greek island, particularly after the rival communities put an end to dyarchy in December, 1963. Bloody incidents burst out in that month in Nicosia and spread across the island.

The Greek Cypriots isolated the Turkish Muslim centers of population and disrupted the life of the minority by disconnecting communities, thus forcing the movement of some Turks to the security of larger Turkish Cypriot centers. Greek-held media presented the incidents to the public and to the world as a Turkish revolt against the republic, calculated to provide a pretext for Turkey to invade the island.

After December, 1963, Muslim Turks evacuated their quarters in 72 mixed villages, abandoned 24 Turkish villages and partially cleared out of 8 other mixed settlements. Moreover, in every one of the 6 mixed district towns, a partial evacuation of Turkish quarters took place. By 1970, about 20,000 Muslim Turks were registered as refugees with Turkish Cypriot welfare authorities.¹⁰ Turks generally abandoned mixed villages in which they were in a minor-

¹⁰See R. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict*, pp. 49ff.

ity, but they also abandoned some villages where they were the majority, since Cypriot-Greek troops had moved into those villages and in effect disturbed the local ethnic balance to Muslim disadvantage. If one takes a broader view of the majority-minority relationship, Turks gave way in the villages in which they constituted a majority when their minority status (and therefore their chances of survival) was considered in a regional context.

According to the Greeks, the major portion of the Turkish exodus from their settlements was initiated and directed by the Turkish master plan to facilitate ultimate partition. On the other hand, Turks claim that they had not developed any contingency plan for population consolidation, nor did they initiate the population transfers; rather, because they were intimidated by Greeks, Muslim Turks moved to the closest Turkish refuge they could find.¹¹

Be that as it may, it is evident that except for the Nicosia enclave, where a strong Muslim quarter survived, the movement of refugees de facto created a Turkish-dominated area in opposition to the Greek-controlled land mass.

The intercession of United Nations troops in Cyprus contributed little to the permanent settlement of the conflict, because the Greek Cypriot government of Makarios continued to rule high-handedly by the mandate of the Greek majority. For a time (1964), the government was prepared to encourage the return of Turkish refugees to their villages, provided they accepted its authority, and they did not return to sensitive areas. But the Turks, either frightened by the Greek majority, or because of *toksim* considerations, actually elected to perpetuate the de facto partition. The Muslim Turks, in sum, could not submit to Christian Greek rule in a situation where they themselves remained the minority. Paradoxically, as long as Cyprus was a British colony, Muslims accepted foreign rule, since their subservience was shared by all inhabitants of the island. But as soon as independence was granted to the island, Muslims could not accept the fact that other Cypriots would wield the reins of power, while the Muslim descendants of the Glorious Ottomans would be pushed to the margin and might even be forced to rejoin Christian Greece.

Turks in Cyprus have consistently declared their readiness to allow their Greek compatriots to join Greece, provided they themselves exercise the same prerogative of joining Turkey. This double-enosis, which was put aside in 1960 in favor of an independent Cyprus, was revived again after 1974, when the escalation of intercommunal clashes made the Turkish invasion of the island inevitable. Turkey's intervention on behalf of Cypriot Muslims came when a military coup by the Greek Cypriots ousted Makarios in July. The coup was hatched and directed by the

military junta at Athens, and Turkey saw the seizure of northern Cyprus and the regrouping of the Turkish minority there under Turkish guns as a measure of self-defense. After the war, the Turks demanded a federal government in Nicosia where the Turkish minority would have an equal voice, or Turkish-Cypriot administration for six cantons in which local Turks would be regrouped. The Geneva talks failed and Turkish forces renewed their advance until they occupied more than one-third of the island. This occupation resulted in the flight of 180,000 Greeks southward to the Greek region while 100,000 Turks were regrouped in the north in houses abandoned by the Greeks. The Cypriot Turks were reinforced by a few thousand mainland Turks, under the pretext of the need for qualified agricultural workers.

Today, northern Cyprus is de facto ruled by Turkey, relying on a strong expeditionary force and the continuing strengthening of Turkish settlements in the north. On the declaratory level, the Muslim Turks of Cyprus continue to advocate either a federated state or total independence in the northern part of the island, but until that can be achieved their dream of reuniting with Turkey (to put it in nationalistic terms), or rejoining the Abode of Islam (to put it in Islamic terms), has become reality.

Just as the Greek Cypriots cannot cease being Christian and Greek, the Turks cannot relinquish their Turkish and Muslim identity. Encouraged by nationalist-Turkish sentiment, Muslims cannot simply accept a Christian rule identified with Greek nationalism. If they had constituted the majority in Cyprus, they could have imposed an Islamic state without many qualms; but as a minority they would rather secede than yield.

CONCLUSIONS

Islam must ultimately assume statehood, because it is a way of life that inseparably encompasses politics and religion. When a Muslim minority happens to live in a non-Muslim state, it remains in many ways outside that state and nurtures separatist ideals that may materialize when the opportunity presents itself.

More recently, because of the mounting power and wealth of some Islamic countries, Islam has become a

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Raphael Israeli is Coordinator of the Asia Research Unit at the Truman Institute of Research, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He is the author of *Muslims in China: A Study of Cultural Confrontation* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979), and *The Public Diary of President Sadat*, 3 vols. (New York: E. J. Brill Publisher, 1978-79) and is the editor of *Islam in Asia: Problems and Perspectives* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1980). He has written many articles on Islam, Islam in China, and on Middle Eastern affairs.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

"... the idea that South Asian politics is being swept by a wave of Islamic resurgence is more myth than reality."

The Myth of Islamic Resurgence in South Asia

BY SHAHEEN F. DIL

Assistant Professor of Politics, Mount Holyoke College

AMERICAN foreign policy toward the Islamic nations of the third world must be reassessed. The formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a powerful cartel controlling vital energy supplies was momentous not only because of the economic implications of its existence, but because OPEC itself is controlled by the oil-rich Arab Muslim states of the Middle East. The upheaval in Iran that overthrew the Shah and established the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as leader of an Islamic and newly revolutionary Iran was further proof of disquiet in the Muslim world.

The failure of the West to anticipate these events was blamed largely on the Central Intelligence Agency. The taking of hostages at the United States embassy in Teheran and the attacks on American embassies in Pakistan, Libya and Bangladesh made it increasingly apparent that the gaps in American foreign policy were caused as much by habits of compartmentalization that inhibited linking religious disaffection with political activism as by failures of intelligence gathering. Many Western analysts suggest that the late 1970's witnessed a revival of Islamic fundamentalism in various areas of the third world. On the face of it, renewed religious fervor has apparently gripped many Islamic nations. But does this really indicate a global resurgence of Islam? Or are other, equally persuasive, motives the source of this upsurge?

In his penetrating study, *Islam in Modern History*, Wilfred Cantwell Smith pointed out that "the year one of this Islamic era—1 A.H. (622 A.D.)—is not the year of Muhammad's birth (as would parallel the Christian case), or even that in which the revelations began to come to him, but the year when the nascent Muslim community came to political power."¹ This statement illustrates a fundamental difference between Islam and other major world religions: Islam is not merely a set of religious beliefs, but a complete

and systematic political ideology. In the consciously secular milieu of the twentieth century, it has been difficult to recognize Islam as a political ideology, because of the Western tradition of judging the rest of the world by Western standards. The West has separated religion and politics for centuries; therefore it assumes that Islamic nations do the same.

Thus Max Weber concludes that "Islam did not confront the ultimate problem of the relationship between religious ethics and secular institutions, which is the fundamental problem of the relation between law and religion."² This is a problem, of course, only from the Western point of view, which assumes a fundamental distinction between law and religion. It is critical to understanding Islam to recognize that for Muslims there is no such distinction. Indeed, for Islamic peoples, law is based almost exclusively on religious precepts. As Fazlur Rahman points out, the structure of Islamic law is built on four foundations: (1) the Qur'an, the Holy book of Islam, embodying the word of God; (2) the Sunna of the Prophet, the example or the practice of the Prophet Muhammad; (3) the Ijma or consensus of Islamic jurists; (4) and Qiyas or analogical reasoning.³ Three of the four sources have directly religious bases, and the fourth, Qiyas, stipulates analogical reasoning from the other three sources and is hence indirectly but clearly linked to religious inspiration.

For Muslims, then, there can be no law except that derived from religion. Majid Khadduri notes in this connection that

The Islamic Law of nations . . . is not a system separate from Islamic law. It is merely an extension of the sacred law, the *Shari'a*, designed to govern the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims, whether inside or outside the territory of Islam. In a word, an Islamic law of nations does not exist as a separate system in the sense that modern municipal [national] law and international law, based on different sources and maintained by different sanctions, are distinct from one another. The *siyar*, if taken to mean the Islamic law of nations, is but a chapter in the Islamic *corpus juris*, binding upon all who believed in Islam as well as upon those who sought to protect their interests in accordance with Islamic justice.⁴

For too long, Western foreign policymakers have refused to acknowledge the inseparability of law and religion in Islamic nations. (It was this gap, perhaps,

¹Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (New York: Mentor Books, 1959), p. 23.

²Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 233.

³Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 68.

⁴Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 6.

which made it so difficult to accept the legitimacy of dividing India into two separate nation-states, one Hindu and one Muslim.) The recent turmoil in Iran changed all that—and the inadequate explanation now offered is the dramatic description of an explosion in the Muslim world or Militant Islam. In truth, however, the idea that South Asian politics is being swept by a wave of Islamic resurgence is more myth than reality.

AFGHANISTAN

Politics in Afghanistan has been characterized in the last 30 years by a dizzying succession of coups and countercoups.⁵ After the British left the subcontinent in 1947, the United States refused to give military assistance to Afghanistan on the grounds that no amount of aid could make it defensible against a determined Soviet attack. Inevitably, this attitude forced Kabul to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance. Although precise figures are not available, Moscow obliged with significant military and economic assistance. Even so, Afghanistan maintained a nonaligned status and accepted economic assistance from both East and West.

During this period, there was little emphasis on the Islamic nature of the Afghan state. Kabul's relations with the Muslim Arab states of the Middle East were limited, and its relations with its two Muslim neighbors were intermittently strained. At question was the region called Pakhtoonistan by the Afghans—an area crossing the national boundaries of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Like most Afghans, the people of this sparsely populated vast area are Pushtu-speaking Muslims. Various Afghan leaders have encouraged separatist tendencies in the area, in part to weaken Pakistan and Iran, in part to gain access to the sea, and in part to stimulate internal cohesiveness among tribal factions by espousing a popular foreign policy.

With the overthrow of King Zahir Shah on July 17, 1973, and the establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan under the leadership of Lieutenant General Mohammad Daud Khan, Kabul's precarious neutrality was momentarily threatened. In view of Daud Khan's socialist inclinations, there was fear in the West that Afghanistan would move completely into the Soviet bloc. Moscow may have anticipated more compliance, yet it became increasingly apparent that Daud, like his predecessor, wanted to maintain an economically beneficial position of nonalignment.

Apparently this ongoing neutrality was not approved by Afghanistan's Soviet-trained and equipped armed forces. On April 27, 1978, leftist officers of the air force and tank units engineered the overthrow of

President Daud Khan. Unlike the relatively peaceful takeover of 1973, this was a bloody coup. Daud Khan, many members of his family, and almost all high ranking officials were killed, and as many as 10,000 Afghans may have died in street fighting. Nur Muhammad Taraki, secretary-general of the formerly outlawed Communist party, assumed the positions of President, Prime Minister, and head of a ruling Revolutionary Council of the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Despite disclaimers, Taraki intended to move Afghanistan closer to socialism. Among his first acts was the appointment of some 20 Communists to Cabinet posts. Within the next several months, Russian became the primary foreign language taught in Afghan high schools. Taraki's party, the People's Democratic party, set up a youth movement closely following the Soviet Young Pioneer model. And news from the West either disappeared or was overshadowed by Soviet news sources. Each of these actions might not be significant. Together they indicated a fairly unambiguous attempt to mold the new Afghan state on the Soviet model.

Although Daud Khan's coup has been greeted with indifference by his countrymen, Taraki's Communist affiliations aroused more ire. Both within Afghanistan and without, the Communist character of Taraki's regime excited trepidation. Most Afghans are illiterate and Islamic. Political shuffles at the top per se do not concern them. What they find alarming is the Marxist, foreign nature of the changes. Indications of widespread unrest during the Taraki regime were rife. Afghan tribesmen along the border regions began to arm against the central government. Rates of desertion from the armed forces increased dramatically. Afghans resented the visibility and omnipresence of Soviet advisers. Kabul's neighbors were equally nervous. Pakistan, having suffered dismemberment once in 1971, feared further upheavals in Baluchistan or the Northwest Frontier Province. Iran, shortly to be engulfed in its own crisis, worried about the possibility of encirclement by staunch Soviet allies.

This widespread unrest under the Taraki regime may have led Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin to stage another coup in September, 1978. Soon afterward, Taraki and several members of his family were killed. The differences between Taraki and Amin were not apparent. Both were Communists; both wanted the "friendship and cooperation" of the Soviet Union; both were so unpopular with the Afghan people that they depended on repression, mass arrests and extensive Soviet aid to stay in power. Differences, if any, were more personal than ideological: Taraki had been the leader of the Khalq faction of the PDP; Amin was the leader of the Parcham faction, which was reputed to be more leftist.

Leftist or not, however, Moscow did not find

⁵See, *inter alia*, Shaheen F. Dil, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great-Power Interaction in Afghanistan," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 71, no. 2 (June, 1977), pp. 468-476.

Amin's regime acceptable. On December 25, 1979, Soviet forces began to move into Kabul, and on December 27, Hafizullah Amin was executed and Babrak Karmal, returning from virtual exile as Kabul's ambassador to Czechoslovakia, assumed the leadership. Later Soviet announcements that they had been invited into Afghanistan by the government of Babrak Karmal rang false in view of the fact that Soviet troops began to arrive in Kabul three days before Karmal returned to Afghanistan to form the new government.

Reaction against this latest coup was violent. For the first time, the Soviet Union had blatantly invaded a nation that called itself nonaligned and that did not lie inside the sphere of Soviet influence in East Europe. Afghan tribesmen battled Soviet troops and sporadically fled across the Pakistan border to regroup their forces. Current violence reflects Afghan resentment at foreign control—whether in the form of native rulers espousing foreign (Communist) doctrine, or in the more blatant Soviet tanks and troops patrolling highways leading to Kabul. Rather, an already deeply entrenched ideology is being marshalled by Afghan tribesmen in an attempt to expel foreign influence.

PAKISTAN

Religious sensibilities played a critical role in the dismemberment of the South Asian subcontinent, because the Muslim minority feared that they would be permanently disadvantaged in an independent India dominated by the Hindu majority. Pakistan was finally born in August, 1947, in an atmosphere of communal hostility, with an explicit ideological commitment to form a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. In the first 25 years of its existence, however, the role of Islam in Pakistani politics was ambiguous.

Pakistan's two wings were separated by 1,300 miles of hostile India; and there was no common language, culture, or historical consciousness among the peoples of East and West Pakistan. Because the only bond justifying Pakistan's existence was a common religion, religion might well have provided the basis of the state. Yet this was not the case. Instead, the early rulers of Pakistan tried to maintain the secular apparatus left by the British. Once it served its function

in creating Pakistan, in post-independence years the Muslim League was attacked for failing to establish a genuinely Islamic state. Loudest in its condemnation of the secular nature of the state was the only truly religious political party in Pakistan at that time—the Jamaat-i-Islami. Under the leadership of Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi, the Jamaat-i-Islami campaigned vigorously for a conservative interpretation of Islam and for the implementation of this conservative idea of Islam upon the body politic. Instead of following Mawdudi's suggestions, the government attempted to stifle religious criticism by repeatedly jailing Mawdudi and harassing the Jamaat-i-Islami.⁶

It was not until 1962 that the government of Pakistan made a conscious effort to emulate Islam. The newly adopted constitution declared in its preamble that the state was "based on Islamic principles of social justice." An Islamic Research Institute was established in Karachi to assist "in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis."⁷ A 1964 amendment to the constitution changed the name of the state to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and obliged the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology to review all laws to ensure their compliance with the precepts of the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet.

Despite these efforts to bring Islam into the constitution, in the 1960's Pakistan's government and laws reflected an ingrained sense of Western-oriented secularism. Pakistan's relations with other Muslim nations were rather strained. The Pakhtoonistan issue kept Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan more or less at loggerheads, and the Arab states of the Middle East resented Pakistan's membership in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact. Mesmerized as it has always been with the specter of a menacing India, Pakistan's motives for joining SEATO and the Baghdad Pact had more to do with obtaining arms from the United States than anything else. To the Arabs, however, Pakistan had joined a military pact with the United States, which was supporting Israel; no other considerations could overshadow this fact. Thus in its 1948 and 1965 wars with India, Pakistan received no support from the Islamic nations, and, in its turn, Pakistan did not endorse the position of other Muslim nations in their domestic or international quarrels.

Indeed, in the late 1960's it became increasingly apparent that the unifying bond of Islam would not preserve Pakistan's territorial integrity. East Pakistan was demanding a more equal share in the operations of the central government and a more equal allocation of resources. Space considerations preclude a discussion of the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate nation.⁸ Suffice it to note that the dismemberment of Pakistan in December, 1971, after a war in which India sided with the former eastern wing, indicates the weakness of religion as a politically unifying force.

⁶See, *inter alia*, Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi," in Donald Eugene Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 371-397.

⁷Freeland Abbott, "Pakistan and the Secular State," in *South Asian Politics and Religion*, pp. 325ff.

⁸See, *inter alia*, Shaheen F. Dil, "The Extent and Nature of Soviet Involvement in the Bangladesh Crisis," *Asia Quarterly*, no. 3, 1973, pp. 243-259; and "The Bangladesh Crisis and East-West Détente," *SAIS Review*, vol. 17 no. 2 (Winter, 1972), pp. 24-28.

As a result of this dismemberment, Pakistan finally abandoned its Western alignment. Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it hosted an international conference of Islamic nations and moved slowly, but apparently surely, toward the Muslim world. The military takeover by Mohammed Zia ul-Haq in July, 1977, continued this process, and General Zia's adoption of Shari'a law dramatized a transition that had been initiated some years earlier. What the Jamaat-i-Islami had been agitating for since 1941 finally came to pass 36 years later. Not surprisingly, the current government supported the revolutionary rule of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran and may indeed have been dilatory in rescuing the United States embassy in Islamabad from an enraged Muslim mob, which falsely believed that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been involved in the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia in November, 1979.

Yet it is difficult to conclude from all this that Pakistan is undergoing a resurgence of Islamic fervor. The people of Pakistan have always been deeply committed to Islam. The change in the attitude of the leadership seems only to reflect political realities. Western models of democracy did not work for Pakistan, and alliances with the United States solved neither its economic nor military problems. Clearly, Pakistan needed a new direction. With the growth in the power of OPEC and the promises of assistance to fellow Muslims on the part of some of the oil-rich nations—notably Saudi Arabia and Libya—Mecca appeared to be a viable alternative direction—a direction that was beautifully compatible with the original ideological principles of Pakistan. What has happened in Pakistan, therefore, is not so much a resurgence of Islam as a discovery of identity, an identity for which Pakistanis have been searching since 1947.

Moscow's December invasion of Afghanistan meant a new threat to Pakistan, as President Zia recognized in a recent speech at Rawalpindi. But Pakistan turned for help to the United States, not to the Muslim world. This does not imply a rejection of Pakistan's Islamic identity, but rather is a realistic recognition that in a confrontation with a great power only another great power can provide sufficient countervailing force.

BANGLADESH

For the first four years of its existence, Bangladesh's relations with the rest of the Muslim world were less than cordial, because most of the Islamic world either explicitly or implicitly supported Pakistan during the 1971 crisis. Sheik Mujibur Rahman's government maintained close ties with India and the Soviet Union. For the most part it ignored and was ignored by the other Muslim nations, partly because of bad feelings created during the 1971 crisis and partly because of the nature of Mujib's government, which immediately

proclaimed itself to be both secular and socialist. Indeed, by March, 1972, the Mujib government had adopted a radically socialist economic policy that included the nationalization of all industries, banks, and insurance companies. Because Pakistan retained the illusory hope of eventually regaining its eastern wing, Islamabad may also have influenced other Muslim nations to withhold recognition from Mujib's regime.

Despite the adulation which greeted him on his return to Dacca from a Pakistani prison, Mujib lost the confidence of the people very quickly. Faced with economic chaos and desperate conditions, he could only offer revolutionary slogans and platitudes that did little to solve his real problems. Corruption was apparently rife both in his immediate family and in the administration. In any event, in August, 1975, Mujib and 22 members of his family were killed in a coup engineered by some young army majors. Astonishingly, this brutal action aroused no response among the people, who apparently were thoroughly disillusioned with Mujib, once affectionately known as Bangabondhu, or Friend of Bengal.

Having eliminated Mujib, the young cabalists had little idea of what to do next. For a few hours it appeared that the People's Republic of Bangladesh would be renamed the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh, but this radio announcement was rescinded. Khondakar Mushtaq Ahmed, an Awami League leader, initially became the President. Unable to control the situation, Ahmed declared martial law and turned the matter over to the army. Eventually, Brigadier Ziaur Rahman emerged as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator.

In April, 1977, Zia assumed the presidency; he received electoral sanction in a June, 1978, election. Ultimately, Zia organized the Bangladesh National party (BNP)—a conglomerate of different factions and groups that nonetheless managed to win over 60 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections of February, 1979. True to his word, Zia abolished martial law within the week, but he remains the civilian head of a civilian administration, because he retired from the army.

Unlike Mujib's exclusive stress on secular, socialistic norms of government, Zia is very much aware that about 85 percent of the population of Bangladesh is Muslim. When he was asked whether the so-called Islamic revivalism in Iran and Pakistan would affect Bangladesh, Zia replied:

In 1977 we changed our constitution, and the constitution brought in Islamic provisions. We give religion due

(Continued on page 185)

Shaheen Fatemah Dil was a visiting Assistant Professor at Smith College in 1978. She has written and lectured on Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

“... it is evident that Islamic revivalism has become an important factor in the politics of the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest Asia,” declares this specialist, who notes that the revival is “still in its nascent stage.”

The Islamic Revival in the Middle East and North Africa

BY RICHARD HRAIR DEKMEJIAN

Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Binghamton

THE reemergence of Islam as a dynamic factor in Middle Eastern and international affairs has suddenly become a major concern in the non-Islamic world. To a Western world preoccupied with economic and security concerns, the reemergence of Islam appears ominous, as it does to the Soviet Union, with its diverse Muslim minorities. It is significant that the West belatedly discovered Islamic revivalism only after the revolutionary overthrow of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi and the subsequent capture of American hostages by Iranian militants seeking the Shah's extradition to face Islamic justice. Now that its existence is finally acknowledged in the United States, Islamic revivalism has become a “media event,” with all its attendant distortions. Caught by surprise, Western statesmen and policymakers have hurried to reassess their assumptions in an attempt to cope with the emerging Islamic challenge.

In evaluating the current Islamic resurgence, several myths and misconceptions must be discarded. As a religion and a way of life, Islam has never been dormant. Despite two centuries of Westernization and modernization, Islam is a vibrant and dynamic faith; it provides a growing number of communicants with spiritual reinforcement and comfort at a time when other religions and ideologies have lost their missionary zeal. Because of its totalistic nature, Islam has resisted the encapsulation that has become the fate of Christianity in the West's secularist milieu. Consequently, manifestations of Islamic revivalism have occurred cyclically, typically in response to crisis situations, when the Islamic umma erupts with a passion of militant puritanism and self-renewal. In such crises, Islamic revivalism becomes “a medium of salvation” for the dispossessed masses and alienated counterelites.

Given these attributes of Islamic revivalism, it is not

¹For a notable exception, see Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam,” *Commentary*, volume 61 (January, 1976), pages 39-49.

²The foregoing analysis is based upon Richard Hrair Dekmejian, “The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives,” *Middle East Journal*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Winter, 1980).

surprising that its manifestations have been misunderstood by the confirmed capitalist and Communist secularists of the advanced non-Islamic countries. Operating within the conceptual confines of secularist materialism, statesmen and scholars have tended to disregard or to underestimate the regenerative capacity of Islam.¹ It is significant that much of the writing about and teaching of Islam in American institutions of higher learning emphasize its traditional nature, implying that it is a transitional phenomenon, somehow bound to disappear under the “inevitable” impact of modernization. In retrospect, it is obvious that Islam has persisted and has reasserted itself in its revivalist form in virtually every Islamic society.

Specific catalysts have been responsible for the Islamic revival. Historically, it has occurred as a response to widespread social crisis. In its present phase, however, the Islamic rebirth movement diverges from the traditional pattern: it lacks a single charismatic leader and it is far more pervasive in its social and geographical scope than its predecessors. Fundamentalist movements like the Wahhabi in Arabia, the Mahdiyyah in the Sudan, the Ikhwan in Egypt and the Fedayan in Iran were organized around charismatic leaders and their impact was mostly limited to specific geographical areas, despite their leaders' efforts to gain a wider following. While the impact of the Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has transcended Iran's boundaries, it is unlikely to emerge as the dominant epicenter of an Islamic revivalist movement, partly due to its Twelver Shi'ite orientation. Yet the crisis factors that existed in imperial Iran are discernible in many other parts of the Islamic world. These include: 1) a crisis of legitimacy of political elites and social systems; 2) ineffective rulership; 3) excessive reliance on coercion for elite control; 4) class conflict in the midst of corruption; 5) military weakness and 6) the disruptive impact of modernization, with its non-Islamic ideologies, values and institutions.²

While this list may not be exhaustive, it seems plausible to argue that the specific implications of Islamic revivalism are likely to develop along these

dimensions of crisis. Indeed, Islamic fundamentalist activity may be directed at these problem areas not only because these are foci of popular dissatisfaction but also because of the remedies that Islam is thought to provide for their resolution.

THE LEADERSHIP DIMENSION

It is no coincidence that most catalytic factors converge on the political elite. Regardless of the regime, in virtually every Muslim state there is large-scale opposition to the ruling elites and, to a significant degree, such opposition can be traced to Islamic fundamentalists. Even without the Islamic revivalist movement, the political elites of the Islamic states have rarely succeeded in the social, economic and military realms. As a matter of fact, failure, however defined, has become a concomitant of leadership except for short durations dominated by nationalistic charismatics.

Political instability has been a persistent feature in many parts of the Islamic world, largely because political elites have failed to establish legitimate and viable political communities, where the resort to force is the exception and not the rule. The problem of legitimacy transcends the Islamic countries to include most of the new states of the third world. In the Islamic context, however, the legitimacy problem is particularly acute because of the very nature of Islam. Consequently, any attempt to forge national polities on the basis of nationalist ideologies is bound to transgress in some degree the legitimizing norms of the Islamic umma which is transnational in its orientation.

Islam has become politically important precisely because nationalist elites and their legitimacy have so dismally failed. Significantly, of all the attempts to forge a nationalist synthesis only four have registered some temporary success—Ataturkism, Nasserism, Ba'thism, and Bourguibism. Yet none has shown any promise of permanence nor the ability to dispense with coercion. Elsewhere in the Islamic world, military or royal autocracies have been dominant, some of which have coopted Islam as a means of self-legitimation. Whatever the strategy of legitimation, the results have been unsatisfactory in terms of achieving long-term stability and public order.

With a weak legitimacy lease, the new elites of the Islamic states have lacked the requisite initial "political capital" to generate effective policies that could constitute the building blocks of a legitimate public order. In polities where conditions have been propitious, policymaking and administration have been arbitrary, discontinuous, and too often pursued in the context of large scale official corruption. The elite's failure to develop and implement socially beneficial policies has led to an erosion of its tenuous legitimacy and a consequent increase in its reliance on force. The

consequent elite misrule has prompted a search for alternatives, including the Islamic polity, which many traditionalist Muslims believe can provide a model of the "just state."

One socially disruptive consequence of elite misrule has been the increase of class polarization in virtually all Islamic countries. With few exceptions, Islamic states are confronted with massive socioeconomic problems that have gone unresolved because of elite incompetence and corruption, high rates of inflation and population growth, and the lack of effective development ideologies. The massive infusion of oil wealth disrupted traditional social patterns and produced gross disparities in wealth both in the oil-rich states and in their poorer economic client states. The absence of control mechanisms for balanced growth and effective income distribution has led to conflicts between classes and ethnic groups in a milieu of official corruption, inflation and conspicuous consumption by pseudo-Westernized political and economic elites. The proponents of the Islamic alternative project a polity where social justice prevails as prescribed by Islamic law, which entails both political and economic justice.

The persistence of military weakness is another component of the Islamic crisis environment. The disparity of military might between the Islamic world and the powerful industrialized states has persisted despite major economic and human sacrifices in recent decades. The repeated Arab defeats by Israel and the resulting loss of Arab Jerusalem and Palestinian lands are cases in point, not to mention the vulnerability of the Islamic countries to Soviet and Western military power. This manifest impotence of the ruling elites has further sapped their legitimacy; it has also exposed them to damaging criticism from Islamic fundamentalists who seek to revive the military might of early Islam.

IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION

Another aspect of the Islamic crisis milieu is the impact of Western and Soviet ideological and cultural influences on Islamic society in terms of behavioral norms, values and institutions. It should be remembered that the initial impulse for Ottoman and Iranian modernization was the desire to check the military prowess of European imperialism. Subsequently, what began as a program of modernization limited to the military spilled into other segments of Islamic life—into politics, social relations and Islam itself. Moreover, the West's impact produced sharp cleavages between traditionalist and modernist intellectuals and statesmen. While the modernists were inclined toward wholesale emulation of Western social theory and practice, most traditionalists rejected Western values and advocated the selective borrowing of aspects of Western experience thought to be com-

patible with Islam, particularly science and technology. The recent decline of Western economic and military power, coupled with the failure of Western-style secularist regimes in the Islamic countries, has strengthened the position of traditionalists throughout the Islamic world. The superficial Westernization of small elite groups in terms of mimicking Western modes of dress and social behavior was contrary to conservative Islamic values and practices. These semi-modernized sectors indulged in the blind emulation of Western technological and militaristic achievements. A case in point was prerevolutionary Iran, where the modernized elites were set apart from the tradition-bound multitudes not only by their non-nativist behavior and conspicuous wealth, but also by their social snobbery that paralleled that of the palace.

The Islamic traditionalist resistance to Communist ideological influences has been even stronger than its resistance to the West. The leftist ideological influences came via the native Communist and socialist parties, European-educated intellectuals and the Soviet cultural and military presence in several Islamic states. Aside from its foreign origins and materialistic foundations, communism has been vehemently attacked by Islamic proponents because of its opposition to religion—a factor that has greatly limited its appeal as a protest movement in the Islamic orbit. The tendency to resist communism is bound to increase with the recent expansion of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

FIVE FOCI OF ISLAMIC RESPONSE

Since political elites are the most visible and privileged segments of society, they are a prime target for Islamic fundamentalist criticism. The legitimacy of a ruler can be challenged on several theoretical grounds that are imbedded in Islamic tradition. First, there is the legitimacy of a leader's accession to authority: is his rulership supported by *ijma*—a popular consensus among the Islamic faithful? However, a legitimacy of consensus only gives the leader and his coterie of elites initial legitimacy to exercise power. In order to perpetuate his continuing legitimacy, the leader will be judged by his personal behavior and performance. He is expected to approximate the behavior of early Arab rulers who are retrospectively venerated. Perhaps the most basic Islamic leadership attribute is the manifestation of *adalah*—a sense of justice—political, social and economic. Here the Qur'anic injunction provides the basis of legitimate rule—*al-adl atas al-hukm*—justice is the foundation of authority.

Other attributes of effective Islamic leadership include strength of personality and decisiveness in the application of Islamic law combined with benevolence and generosity. The leader is also expected to show

courage in confronting the enemies of Islam, to be a *ghazi*—a victorious warrior—since as a martial religion Islam gives its blessing to its leaders and armies as defenders of the faith and the state combined. Moreover, the leader is expected to lead an austere and pious life (*zuhd*).

Measured against these standards of personal and political conduct, most of today's Islamic elites are found wanting. In each polity it is necessary to determine the extent to which *ijma* has been replaced by rule through naked force. With respect to the economic policies of the elite, Muslim fundamentalists oppose corruption and press for communal sharing of wealth and privilege in keeping with the deeply held Islamic notion of social justice. It is not surprising that the concept of Islamic socialism has received increasing attention from Islamic theorists in recent years. Furthermore, in the perceptions of revivalist Muslims, a leader's quest for accommodation with an enemy may well be seen as evidence of personal cowardice. Nor are they likely to tolerate excessively nationalist and secular Western constructs of elite self-legitimation that are considered foreign to Islam and its transnational unity.

REVIVALISM IN ACTION

During the 1970's, concrete manifestations of Islamic revivalism appeared in important Islamic states. Since the fundamentalist criticism of existing regimes is multidimensional—political, social and economic—Islam has emerged as a powerful protest ideology, opposing the establishment on the grounds of religion. Those states where gross maldistribution of wealth exists side by side with widespread poverty are particularly vulnerable. In such situations, political elites are perceived as the perpetrators of socioeconomic injustice. The Iranian revolution against Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi and the January, 1977, riots in Egypt are examples of Islamic proletarianism that are likely to be repeated elsewhere. Nor are the traditional monarchies secure, despite their claim to Islamic legitimacy.

With the possible exception of Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, there are large islands of poverty in Saudi Arabia and the lesser states of the Gulf. The shocking seizure of Islam's holiest shrine, the Grand Mosque of Mecca, in November, 1979, was more than an act of fanaticism; it represented the confluence of at least three strains of resistance to Saudi rule—rejection of Saudi dynastic legitimacy, tribal opposition, and class conflict. The rebels included a ragtag army of the poor, disgruntled tribal elements, a significant number of non-Saudi Arabs and other Muslims—all led by one who claimed to be the *madhi*—"the expected one." The takeover constituted a puritanical challenge on Islamic grounds against the official puritanism of the Saudi establishment based on

Wahhabism; the challenge combined religious discontent with social, tribal, ethnic and economic opposition to the regime. An enlightened Saudi response based on self-interest would require more than heightened coercion and vigilance and would include comprehensive political and economic reform.

JORDAN AND MOROCCO

The two other Arab monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, lack oil wealth and are immune to its mixed blessings. Careful diplomacy combined with internal moderation and army support have given the Jordanian kingdom a measure of stability that has eluded its more powerful neighbors. Having suppressed Palestinian militancy (1970-1971), King Hussein has emerged as a champion of Palestinian rights. The problems of King Hassan of Morocco, a country plagued by conflicts along ethnic, class and ideological dimensions, are more serious. Despite the King's cooption of Islam as an instrument for self-legitimation, he stands vulnerable to an Islamic protest movement reinforced by class dissatisfaction against the palace and the political elite. The King's efforts to distract popular discontent by annexing the northern part of the Spanish Sahara appear to have backfired in the context of a bloody war with the Polisario guerrillas.

An effective symbiosis of Islamic precepts and non-Islamic modernizing elements has eluded most Middle East regimes. Only in Algeria and Libya has there been some success in this regard. In both cases, oil and Islamic puritanism are factors. Under Houari Boumediene and his successors, the Algerian military-technocratic elite has combined Islamic and socialistic practices with some success. Significant strides in economic development have been effected in a controlled environment, thereby minimizing social conflict in a relatively large polity. In Libya, the military revolution of 1969 brought forth Muammar Qaddafi—a Nasserite pan-Arabist, with an Islamic conscience of tribal puritanism. Despite the distraction of foreign adventures, Qaddafi has attempted to build Islamic polity by incorporating Qur'anic, Nasserite and socialist maxims within the administrative framework of direct or popular democracy—the Jamahiriyyah. It is too early to forecast whether Qaddafi's experiment of charismatic routinization will succeed, in view of the potentially disruptive influence of massive oil wealth on a relatively small population. Two external determinants of success or failure are Libya's relations with its powerful Egyptian neighbor and the scope of the Soviet presence in the country.

In contrast to Algeria and Libya, Islamic revivalism in Tunisia could become a destabilizing force. The institutional strength of the Destourian Socialist party has been progressively eroded in the face of economic problems and labor unrest. Tunisia not only lacks the

oil wealth of its neighbors, but it also suffers from a crisis in leadership—a struggle for succession for the still preeminent position of the aging Habib Bourguiba. These problems, coupled with the Destourian elite's record of pro-Western and secularist orientation, may make Tunisia a fertile milieu for an Islamic movement. In January, 1980, there were reports of an abortive Libyan attempt to export Islamic revolution by dispatching a commando force into Tunisia.

ISLAM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

One major characteristic of Islamic revival is its potential as a unifying movement. However, because of "the mosaic effect"—the segmented structure of most Islamic states along tribal, linguistic and sectarian lines—the tendency toward pan-Islamic unity is often diluted or even aborted. The development of transnational revivalist consciousness has coincided with the emergence of ethnic identity in many Islamic countries. Moreover, in some states, Islamic revivalism has actually exacerbated ethnic conflicts; e.g., in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan.

Syria and Iraq are socially diverse Arab states where Islamic revivalism has produced significant intercommunal conflict. Opposing factions of the Ba'th party govern these traditional centers of Arab nationalism. Although avowedly secularist, both Ba'thist regimes profess loyalty to the Islamic faith that is recognized as the state religion. Yet, in both states Islamic revivalism has become a threat to the ruling elites. In Syria, the wellspring of Islamic revivalism is the majority Sunni community (70 percent), some members of which have used Islamic orthodoxy as a protest movement against the politically dominant Alawi Muslims (11 percent) and to a lesser extent, against the prosperous Christian community. In Iraq, the process is reversed; the large Twelver Shi'ite Arab community has been experiencing a massive Islamic revival led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran—a movement directed at the Ba'th government in Baghdad, where members of the smaller Sunni Arab minority are dominant. Confronted with Iranian-inspired Shi'ite militancy, in addition to Kurdish and Communist internal opposition, the Iraqi government executed a diplomatic about-face after mid-1979, which included rapprochement with the United States, conservative Arabs and other Islamic states. This change in international polarity coincided with the accession to power of Saddam Hussein and a major purge of dissidents in the ruling Ba'th party. In sharp contrast, during 1979 Syria moved closer to the Soviet Union as a direct response to its increasingly exposed position against Israel.

The explosive combination of Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic revival is also discernible in Turkey

and Iran. In Turkey, the reassertion of Islamic consciousness began after the 1950 victory of the Democratic party, which proceeded to relax some of the government's restrictive policies toward Islam. In subsequent years, an Islamic party was established to give political expression to the new movement in the context of Turkey's unstable coalition governments during the 1970's. While this constituted a reversal of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's often repressive secularist policies, it also brought into the open the long suppressed religious sentiments of a large traditionalist segment of the Turkish population. Meanwhile, another component of Atatürk's legacy was eroded—the presumed "Turkishness" of the peoples of Turkey, maintained through the coercive instrumentalities of the state. In actual fact, despite the deportation and liquidation of Armenians, Greeks and others in the final days of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey remained a heterogeneous polity of Turks, Kurds, Lazs, Alevis and other ethnic groups in a conflict that was further exacerbated by ideological polarization between leftists and rightists.

The outcome was a protracted conflict along Islamic, ethnic and ideological lines, dominated by shifting coalitions of civilian elites, who have been unable to end the ongoing civil violence. In this complex arena, Islamic revivalism has reinforced the dominance of the Turkish Sunni majority, whose preeminent nationalistic aspirations transcend Sunni Islamic identity to include association with their ethnic brothers in Iran, Iraq, Syria and the U.S.S.R. On another front, the Islamic revival among the Sunni Turks has alienated the Alevi community, a Shi'ite group with co-religionists in northwestern Syria. Since most Kurds and Alevis are also economically disadvantaged, their clashes with the Turkish majority frequently assume an ideological coloration, whereby the regime is caught between Islamic rightists and Pan-Turkists who fight the leftists, the Kurds, Alevis and Turkish proletariat. Other implications of Turkish Islamic revivalism include general opposition to the secularism of the regime and pressure to seek Turkish alignment with the Islamic world and the severance of ties to Israel and the United States.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 was a true revolution in the classical sense; it was also an unprecedented expression of organized Islamic fervor against a despotic, corrupt and secular monarchy. In its inception, it was a broad grass-roots movement of popular forces, representing a coalition of groups covering the total sweep of Iran's ideological spectrum. At the moment of the revolutionary breakthrough, the movement was dominated by the most conservative and militant faction of the Persian clergy, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Its success vis-à-vis the other partners of the anti-Shah coalition was due to its superior organization, as well as the ability

of its charismatic leader to generate mass support by directing a chiliastic appeal to the Islamic popular conscience. In this sense, the Khomeini phenomenon approximates Max Weber's model of charismatic leadership that emerges in times of acute social crisis to destroy the old order. This type of spiritual revolution was clearly beyond the comprehension of secularized Western or Soviet leaders, diplomats and intelligence services. Two other factors favored the success of the Islamic revolution. The first was the nature of the Pahlavi monarchy—its origins and rulership. Indeed, even the most flexible application of Islamic criteria to the Shah's rule would find it wanting. Yet in a theopolitical sense, the Islamic challenge transcended the dynasty's manifest corruption, systematic brutality, unlimited material greed and superficial adoption of Western life-styles and modernization. At the most basic level, it concerned the legitimacy of the ruling house since its violent inception in the 1920's. Not only had Colonel Riza usurped the Iranian throne; he had proceeded to suppress the Islamic clerical establishment. Furthermore, Riza Shah attempted to undermine Islam as an ideology by introducing an Iranian nationalism based on the pre-Islamic glories of the Persian Zoroastrian civilization. This was a disorienting experience for a polity of traditionalist Muslims; it was also an intolerable act from a strictly Islamic perspective that assumed particular urgency in Iran's Shi'ite environment.

Because of its painfully pathological historical experience and its belief system based on the House of Ali, Twelver Shi'ism developed a heightened political consciousness, which in its ultimate logic rejected any form of worldly dynastic kingship. As the sole repository of religious and political legitimacy, the House of Ali would once again assume worldly power through the reappearance of the twelfth imam, who as mahdi would descend to lead his people to spiritual and political salvation. Pending the imam's return, the Shi'ite polity would be governed by his worldly representatives—the mujtahids—the learned interpreters of Islamic law. After centuries of persecution in the larger Sunni Islamic context, the Iranian Muslims were determined to establish Shi'ite authority in the only state where Shi'ism is numerically dominant. Therefore, regardless of his positive or negative attributes, the Shah was unacceptable. It is noteworthy that the position reserved for Khomeini in Iran's new Islamic constitution is that of faqih—the learned scholar-interpreter of divine law (figh), who will act as the "hidden" imam's temporary representative to guide his flock.

It is ironic that the victory of Islam in Iran has generated intense intercommunal conflict. While interethnic conflict has been endemic to Iran, one would have expected that the universalistic tenets of Islam

would exercise a pacifying influence. This has not been the case for a number of reasons. At the most general level, the weakening of central authority virtually always produces stronger ethnic expectations of greater freedom and autonomy. With respect to the Sunni non-Persian segments of the tribal populations—Kurds, Baluchis, Turkomans, Arabs—the central authorities in Teheran represented Persian Shi'ite domination. Therefore, Khomeini's Islamic revolution accomplished little more than the replacement of the Shah with the Shi'ite clerical establishment. Indeed, the Shi'ites' spiritual revival and political ascendancy exacerbated the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict. Less active politically are other tribal elements—Bakhtiari, Lurs, Qashqai, Sistanis—at least for the time being. Nor have the non-tribal minorities—Armenians, Zoroastrians and Jews—been comforted by the revolution. Because of the close relationship between the Shah and Israel, the Iranian Jewish community has become particularly suspect to the new Islamic elites. The Armenian and Zoroastrian communities have quietly adapted themselves to the Islamic cultural milieu.

Far more serious is the unrest among Iran's largest non-tribal group—the Azeri Shi'ites of the northwest, whose ethnic brothers live in the contiguous region of the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijani S.S.R. Initially, the Azeri Shi'ite leadership around Ayatollah Kazim Shariat-Medari was actively involved in the anti-Shah revolution. But the rise of Khomeini and his consequent assumption of the role of faqih alienated the Azeris, leading to repeated clashes between the government's militia and the people of Iranian Azerbaijan. The common bond of Shi'ism was insufficient to surmount Azeri-Persian ethnic cleavages, mainly based on historical and linguistic differences.

PAKISTAN

The potential for ethnic conflict is equally serious in Pakistan, which made Islam the *raison d'être* for its separation from India. Despite the cohesive force of Islam, the Pakistani experience in nation-building has not been too successful. The military regime under General Zia ul-Haq has attempted to coopt Islamic fundamentalist tenets to shore up its failing legitimacy, particularly after its unpopular decision to execute former Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto in mid-1979. While most Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims, the country faces massive economic problems compounded by intertribal conflict between Sindhis, Punjabis, Baluchis and Pathans. The recent expansion of Soviet military power into Afghanistan may produce a temporary façade of internal unity. Coupled with the anticipated increase in American economic and military aid, this may well strengthen the military regime. However, in the long run, tribal rivalries, economic problems and the legitimacy crisis involving the elite

may have a cumulative effect. These internal factors, intensified by Soviet and Indian pressure, could overwhelm Pakistan's Islamic unity and lead to its disintegration.

Egypt is one of the three most crucial states for the United States in the Islamic/Arab orbit, because of its strategic location, its large and relatively homogeneous population, its control of the Suez Canal, and its possession of a battle-tested military machine—the best in the Islamic world. The dramatic conjunction of events before, during and after the October, 1973, war with Israel caused the reversal of the international and ideological polarity of the Egyptian state. Instead of remaining a somewhat pro-Soviet, semi-socialist entity, Egypt became a close American ally, with an increasingly capitalistic orientation. One major example of the United States-Egyptian rapprochement was the Camp David accords with Israel, according to which parts of the Sinai Peninsula have been returned to Egypt in the context of the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. This significant development was achieved primarily through the personal efforts of President Anwar Sadat, aided by President Jimmy Carter's diplomatic mediation and Israeli receptiveness to a settlement. The Camp David formula, however, was a mixed blessing for Egypt and the United States, because of its rejection by the Arab-Islamic bloc and its allies in the third world. Egypt gained territory, Israeli friendship and considerable American military and economic assistance. Yet it lost its political primacy in the Arab world and its moral influence among the Muslim nations and the nonaligned states. The economic deprivation resulting from the Arab economic boycott and the cut-off of economic aid from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states was offset by major United States contributions to Egypt's faltering economy. This was the setting in which Islamic revivalism developed in Egypt in recent years.

It should be noted that during the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Islamic fundamentalism was directed against the secularist and quasi-socialist policies of the revolutionary regime. Its organized medium was the Muslim Brotherhood, which was repeatedly suppressed by the authorities. However, Nasserite ideologues borrowed heavily from Islamic maxims; and the regime made the clerical establishment an obedient arm of its bureaucracy. The accession of Sadat

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Richard Hrair Dekmejian is the author of *Egypt Under Nasser* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971) and *Patterns of Political Leadership: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1975) and articles on Middle Eastern affairs. His current research includes the political and strategic implications of Islamic revivalism.

"Many Islamic countries are now in ferment, but there is very little evidence of Muslim militancy inside the Soviet Union, nor is it likely that Muslims outside the U.S.S.R. will launch an anti-Soviet holy war. Nonetheless, Soviet leaders worry about the possibility of Islamic renaissance and revivalism in the Central Asian provinces."

The Muslim Minority in the Soviet Union

BY SHEIKH R. ALI

Associate Professor of Political Science, North Carolina Central University

COMPRISING one-sixth of the earth's surface and sprawling across 11 time zones, the Soviet Union embraces more than 100 ethnic and religious nationalities. One out of every five people in the Soviet Union is a Muslim, some 50 million people, who constitute the world's fifth largest Muslim population.

Islam in the Soviet Union is regulated by an official statute drawn up in accordance with article 124 of the Soviet constitution. The Muslim minority is controlled by four spiritual directorates organized territorially:

1. The spiritual directorate for the Sunni Muslims of European Russia and Siberia;
2. The directorate for the Sunni Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan;
3. The directorate for the Sunni Muslims of the Northern Caucasus and Dagestan; and
4. The directorate for the Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims of Transcaucasia.

Other Muslim communities in the U.S.S.R. do not have any officially recognized status.

Many Muslims have moved away from Islam and have adopted the Soviet way of life; yet they do not want to break away entirely from the religion of their ancestors. Thus Islam manages to survive in a secular and Communist nation.*

The Muslims of pre-revolutionary Russia were less unified than any other group in the Muslim world.¹ Islam, which arrived in Azerbaijan and Central Asia in the 8th century, made steady progress until the Communist takeover of the Soviet Union in 1917. Thereafter the Soviet Communist party "consistently subordinated its basic hostility to Islam, as a form of

religious belief, to the needs of its internal and external policies."²

In pre-revolution Russia, the Muslim peoples were in various stages of evolution ranging from the clan to the already formed bourgeois nation. As a result of its contact with the more advanced material civilization of the Russians, Muslim society was undergoing profound changes. Although the Muslim intelligentsia tried to establish the political unity of the Muslims under the banner of Islam, they never attracted many supporters among the Muslims in Russia, except among conservative elements.

The October, 1917, Revolution occurred before the Muslim national movement grew in importance. After the October Revolution, the government set out to gain the sympathy of the Muslim population both inside the Soviet borders and outside. Several tactical considerations were adopted. On November 24, 1917, a special appeal was addressed to all the "toiling Muslims of Russia and the East."³ The powerfully worded appeal carried the signatures of Lenin and Stalin and was addressed to the Muslims of Russia:

whose mosques and prayer houses have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled upon by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia Your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are declared henceforth free and inviolable. Organize your national life freely and without hindrance. This is your right. Know that your rights . . . are protected by the entire might of the revolution Support this revolution and its Government.⁴

The legal position of the Muslim minority in the Soviet Union was further clarified by the decree of January 23, 1918, on the separation of the church from the state. A Central Muslim Commissariat was set up under Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, and (in contrast to the hostility then displayed toward the Orthodox Church and other minorities) attacks on Muslims were not encouraged by the ruling elites.

But the basic Marxist attitude toward Islam, based on the idea that Islam, like every other religious movement, was reactionary, remained unchanged. After the civil war, the Commissariat for Nationalities was reorganized and the Commissariat for Muslim Affairs disappeared.

*In the same way, Muslims have survived and prospered under communism in Albania (which has a Muslim majority population), Bulgaria, Poland and Yugoslavia. Small groups of Muslim minorities also exist in Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Romania.

¹Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), pp. 400-404.

²Robert Conquest, *Religion in the USSR* (London: The Bodley Head, 1968), p. 67.

³Quoted in *ibid.*, p.68.

⁴*Ibid.*

When the Bolsheviks took over the government, they avoided conflict with the Muslims. Those who wanted to be both Muslim and Communist could do so during the first years of the Soviet regime. The Muslim Communist believed in Allah, and he observed religious rites. Communist party conferences were interrupted for Muslim prayer.

The directive of the Muslim Commissariat was to awaken the Muslim masses to political consciousness to permit them to take an active part in the work of the revolution. The Muslim leaders of the Soviet Union tried to build a "state within the state." The Muslim Commissariat—independent of the Russian-dominated Soviets—handled all the domestic affairs of the Muslim community.

Muslim leaders were aware that political autonomy made no sense so long as the Muslims lacked trained personnel. A Muslim Socialist Red Army, numbering some 50,000, was formed.⁵ The Communist rulers, alive to the danger of a revival of Islamic nationalism inside the Soviet Union, placed the Muslim army under the command of the Red Army, incorporating Muslim regiments in larger Communist units.

Most Muslims were in fact hostile or suspicious of the designs of the Communist regime, fearing that the regime would destroy Islamic rites, laws and traditions at the earliest opportunity. The suspicions of the Muslims in general and Muslim Communists in particular delayed the introduction of the Soviet system in Muslim regions of the Soviet Union.

The first Congress of the Muslim Communists was convened in Moscow on November 5, 1918. The Congress voted in favor of a resolution tabled by Stalin which ordered the Muslim Communist party to merge with the Bolshevik party. The Muslim Commissariat was abolished. The dream of a Muslim state and Muslim government in the Soviet Union never came true. Slowly and gradually, the Soviet regime closed, destroyed or secularized Vakufs, the religious endowments, mosques and Qur'anic schools and the Shari'a (religious) courts. Mosques were converted into schools, clubs, cinemas, and reading rooms, or transformed into hotels and prisons.

No exact figures are available on the extent of damage caused to Islam by the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. In one area—Bashkiria—the number of Muslim clergymen declined from 3,000 to 300. Similar decreases were common in other areas. According to a British authority, the Soviet Muslims were subjected to the threefold pressures of political

⁵Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 90.

⁶H. Seton-Watson, "Five Years of Cold War," in George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds., *The Year Book of World Affairs* (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1953), p. 36.

⁷Conquest, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

terror, economic exploitation and cultural oppression. "Between 1929 and 1933 Stalin condemned to death by starvation some two-fifths of the Kazakh nation"⁶

Nonetheless Islam continued to play a major role in the private life of many Muslims. In 1930, it was estimated that three-fourths of the Muslim community in certain areas still observed religious rites. But by the time World War II began, Muslims had been reduced to a subdued minority. Because Muslim leaders summoned the faithful to rise up to defend the Soviet Union and to pray for the victory of the Red Army, a representative conference of the leaders of the Soviet Muslim community was permitted to meet at Ufa in 1942. A Central Asian Muslim Conference was held at Tashkent in 1943, and yet another conference of important Muslim leaders was allowed at Baku in 1944. At the same time, mosques were allowed to reopen, and by the time the war ended, there were as many as 3,000 mosques in the Soviet Union. In 1945, a group of Soviet Muslims were allowed to undertake the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Since 1953, the right to undertake Hajj to Mecca has been granted to a small group of Soviet Muslims.

The wartime recognition accorded to the Muslims also helped the Soviet Union to expand diplomatic relations with Middle East Muslim countries, like Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Diplomatic relations were also restored with Saudi Arabia.

Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Muslims have enjoyed a position similar to that of the Russian Orthodox Christians.

On the one hand, the Soviet Communist party has sought to eradicate this faith [Islam] in campaigns of varying intensity. On the other hand, the Muslim leaders have judged it expedient to give full support to Soviet policies as the price for the continued existence of their institutions.⁷

In line with Communist policy Soviet Muslim leaders persistently charged that the United States and other Western powers were imperialists and warmongers. They protested against the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. Soviet Muslim leaders also supported all initiatives of the World Peace Council on the need for German unification.

Still, Muslims have survived as a Soviet minority. Delegations of Soviet Muslim leaders have visited various Muslim countries, and Muslim leaders have been invited to visit important Muslim regions in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Muslim delegations try to convince Muslim nations that there is freedom of religion in the Soviet Union and that their brethren in the Soviet Union are wealthy and enjoy cultural amenities. The Muslim dignitaries who visit the Soviet Union are shown important historic Islamic sites,

including ancient mosques. Services in the Moscow mosque are attended by representatives from Muslim diplomatic missions accredited to the Soviet Union. The Moscow mosque performs more or less the same function as the Islamic Center in Washington, D.C.

The main difference between the mosques in the capitals of the superpowers is that the Washington mosque is managed and financed by the Muslim embassies in Washington, while the Moscow mosque is run by the Russian Muslims. The Washington Islamic Center is an important tourist attraction, and the Moscow mosque plays an important part in Soviet propaganda to the Muslim world.

The Communist regime in the Soviet Union finds it difficult to wipe out Muslim customs. Superficially, the targets of anti-Muslim propaganda have been the secondary aspects of Islam: the veil of the Muslim women; the pilgrimage to a sacred tomb; the wasteful ways in which Muslim feasts are celebrated; circumcision often carried out under unhygienic conditions. However, the real target is Islam as a religion. The official Marxist view was clarified in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* of 1953:

Like all religions, Islam has always played a reactionary role, being a weapon in the hands of the exploiting classes and an instrument for the spiritual oppression of the workers and for the subjection of the peoples of the East by foreign colonialists.⁸

In the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union, anti-religious propaganda has been led by the All Union Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge. The society publishes atheist pamphlets in local languages and trains lecturers in the art of propaganda against religion. A permanent House of the Atheist, a University of Scientific Atheism, and a House of Political Education have been established.

CULTURAL INFLUENCE

Because of this propaganda, the influence of Russian culture on the Muslim minority is extensive, except in territories that are difficult to reach. Cultural assimilation is vigorously pursued by the Russian majority. Thus Russian cultural influence is strongly felt in Kazakhstan, Caucasus and the Middle Volga; there is little or no Russian cultural influence in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan, where the Russians are in the minority.

Professional contacts between the Russians and the Muslim minority become more and more frequent as the Muslims climb the social ladder, particularly in government offices, industry, schools and the army. The proportion of Muslim workers is low in all categories of employment, and the Soviet army is one of the principal instruments of russification of the Muslims.

⁸Quoted in Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay, *op. cit.*, p. 139

The linguistic policy of the Soviet authorities tends to superimpose Russian on the Muslim languages to suit the interests of national integration. The Muslims who live in the cities and towns have lost the use of their mother tongue, and have adopted Russian. These are the Muslim intellectuals, workers and military personnel who are permanently employed among the Russians. The influence of Russian culture and national integration is apparent among the intelligentsia and the urban dwellers, but there is little Soviet influence on rural Muslims. On the surface, the Muslim intellectual seems almost completely russianized and indifferent to religious dogma and practice, but he remains attached to Islamic customs and traditions. This is not peculiar to Muslims in the Soviet Union: indifference to the day-by-day practice of religious rites and dogma is pervasive among the Muslim elites in Islamic countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and even in the Arab world.

The Soviet attitude toward Muslim national consciousness varies—it is approved when it can be played off against pan-Islamic sentiments but stigmatized when it runs counter to Soviet policies of integration and patriotism.

Today, Soviet officials fear that currents of Islamic fervor sweeping Iran might cross the border and infect the Muslims of Central Asia. When the Soviet Union felt the heat of Islamic fervor in another neighboring country, Afghanistan, Soviet action was prompt to impose order on a chaotic neighbor. The rebellion of the fundamentalist Muslims against a Marxist regime in Afghanistan was forcibly put down by Russian troops. This development probably confirms the Russian Muslim belief in the superiority of the socialist over the capitalist system. Unrest in Southwest Asia gives the Soviet Union an opportunity to extend its influence in the region.

Many Islamic countries are now in ferment, but there is very little evidence of Muslim militancy inside the Soviet Union, nor is it at all likely that Muslims outside the U.S.S.R. will launch an anti-Soviet holy war. Nonetheless, Soviet leaders worry about the possibility of Islamic renaissance and revivalism in the Central Asian provinces. The result of this concern may be reduced suppression of the Muslims at home and superficial observance of Islamic customs and traditional Muslim law on the part of Soviet troops based in Afghanistan, both to calm the population there and to influence Iranians and Pakistanis in favor of Soviet policy. Thus Soviet leaders hope to woo the Muslim ethnic minorities in the Iranian province of

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Sheikh R. Ali has also been a professor of political science at Shaw University. The author of *Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy* (New York: Praeger, 1976), he was a Fulbright scholar at New York University.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON ISLAM AND THE ARAB WORLD

ISLAM, NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF SUDAN. *By Gabriel Warburg.* (London: Frank Cass, 1978. 253 pages and index, \$20.00.)

This study traces the evolution of the Sudan into a political community since the end of World War I, exploring the Islamic and secular forces that have thus far frustrated efforts to establish a stable democratic system. A detailed treatment of the Sudanese Communist party enhances the value of this thoughtful work.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

THE RAMADAN WAR, 1973. *By Hassan El Badri, Taha El Magdoub, and Mohammed Dia El Din Zohdy.* (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1978. 239 pages and appendix, \$14.95.)

Three senior Egyptian military officers, who were involved in the planning of the October 1973 war, offer an Egyptian perspective on the planning and conduct of the war. The war was intended to be

limited, designed to maximize Arab-diplomatic leverage. There are many interesting details on the problems that faced Egyptian planners. A.Z.R.

NASSER AND HIS GENERATION. *By P.F. Vatikiotis.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 375 pages and index, \$22.50.)

This view of Nasser as a revolutionary offers new insights into the radical political forces which brought him to power, and which he ultimately tried to control for his own ends. The authors focus on internal Egyptian developments and institutions and how Nasser shaped and was in turn shaped by them. A.Z.R.

ARAB RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. *Edited by Colin Legum and Haim Shaked.* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979. 104 pages and chronology, \$6.95, paper.)

THE JEWS OF ARAB LANDS: A HISTORY AND SOURCE BOOK. *By Norman A. Stillman.* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1980. 473 pages, illustrations, selected bibliography

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Selected Islamic Terms and Names

Ali. Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, the fourth Caliph.

Ayatollah (Sign or Miracle of God). A religious teacher whose knowledge and piety is so highly respected that he is accepted as a special guide by believers. This is most common in the Shi'a community in Iran.

Caliph (Khalifa or "Successor"). Successor to the Prophet Muhammad as a leader of the Islamic community.

Dawah. Muslim missionary groups.

Dhimmi (protected people). Jews and Christians under Muslim rule.

Hajj. Pilgrimage to Mecca.

Ijma. A consensus of Islamic jurists.

Imam. In Shi'a Islam, one of a divinely guided line of leaders beginning with Ali; the rightful leader of the Islamic community; in general, a Muslim religious or political leader; the leader of group prayer.

Jihad. A holy war of Muslims against non-Muslims.

Mahdi. In popular Islam, the awaited divinely guided ruler who will establish a rule of justice on earth.

Marabus. Religious leaders (not formal political leaders).

Muhammad. The Prophet of Islam.

Qiyas. Analogical reasoning.

Qur'an (Koran). The basic foundation of Islam, the record of God's revelation to Muhammad.

Shari'a. Code of law taken from the Qur'an.

Shi'a Islam. The Islamic groups who believe that leadership in the community should have passed directly from Muhammad to Ali and then to a line of divinely guided imams. The Shi'ites emphasize the need for a personal focus of divine guidance.

Sufi. A mystic.

Sunna. The traditions recording the words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.

Sunni Islam. The tradition of the majority of Muslims who accept the historical experience of the early community as having been divinely guided. Sunnites emphasize the importance of the community and communal tradition.

Tariqas. Muslim brotherhoods.

Twelfth Imam. The Imam who went into seclusion in the ninth century and whose reappearance is anticipated by the Twelver Shi'ites.

Ulama. The collective term describing the learned men and teachers in Islam.

Umma. The Islamic community; the universal ecclesia of Islam.

THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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brought a significant reversal of Islamic policy. Lacking Nasser's charisma and power base, Sadat courted the Islamists by freeing Muslim Brethren from prison and by explicitly projecting his own life-style of Muslim piety and virtue, a genuine manifestation of Sadat's personality and his conservatism.

Soon, however, the new regime was confronted by manifestations of Islamic revivalism that it could not long tolerate. One problem was the increasing communal conflict between the Coptic Christian minority and intolerant Islamic elements during the early 1970's. More serious was the emergence of secret Islamic societies that periodically challenged the authorities by terroristic means. Aside from such marginal groups, there was increasing evidence of an emerging broad grass-roots Islamic movement during the late 1970's, which in the long run may constitute a potent challenge to the Egyptian ruling order.

Three distinct areas divide the Islamic fundamentalists from the regime. There is general dissatisfaction with Sadat's initiatives toward Israel, which have alienated the Arab-Islamic countries without satisfactorily resolving the Palestinian problem and the status of Islamic holy places in Jerusalem. The second area of Islamic opposition is the intensity of the Egyptian-United States relationship and its long-term social, economic and military consequences. Under Nasser, the Islamic opposition was directed against the Soviet Union. After Sadat's elimination of the Soviet presence, Islamic attention came to focus on the progressive Americanization of Egyptian society and the consequent creeping secularism of the West. The third and most fundamental focus of Islamic criticism highlights the regime's social and economic policies. Despite the government's success in attracting large-scale economic aid from the United States, the Arab world, and other industrial countries, its policy of *infitah*—opening to the West—has not produced salutary results. Alongside its inefficient public sector, Egypt has tried to build a large private sector, which has worked for the benefit of the upper and upper-middle classes. In the context of spiraling inflation and rising foreign debt, Egyptian society has been plagued by growing unemployment and massive shortages in urban housing and services. Manifestations of conspicuous consumption and official corruption have increased the regime's vulnerability

to its Islamic critics. This vulnerability was demonstrated in January, 1977, when the government withdrew its price supports for basic commodities, a step that led to mass rioting, repression, and reinstitution of state subsidies.

At the onset of the 1980's the Egyptian situation possesses all the elements of a crisis cycle—maldistribution of wealth, class polarization, social alienation—that could trigger mass opposition against the ruling elite, with incalculable consequences for Israel, the United States and the West. In such an event, it is likely that Islamic revivalism will absorb the discontented and unite them in a massive protest movement against the regime.

In conclusion, it is evident that Islamic revivalism has become an important factor in the politics of the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest Asia. It is, however, still in its nascent stage. Despite similarities, the concrete manifestations and consequences of Islamic revival are likely to be different in specific Islamic countries. The obvious similarities between the Iranian and Egyptian cases should not hide basic differences in history, leadership, national character, and Islamic ethos. Egypt's benevolent authoritarianism is a far cry from the Shah's brutal dictatorship; and Egyptian Sunnism does not possess the political militancy of Iranian Shi'ism.

Meanwhile, the developing anatomy of Islamic fundamentalism may be shaped by unforeseen events that will surely buffet the Islamic conscience in the coming decade. One possible factor is the evolving Soviet-American confrontation in the Gulf area, which gives the United States a rare opportunity to depict itself as a defender of Islam against Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan and beyond. In that event, it is possible that the Islamic movement might emerge as a powerful anti-Soviet force. Nevertheless, it would be difficult for the United States to assume the sponsorship of the Islamic unity movement without first resolving the Palestinian and Jerusalem issues. The resolution of these thorny problems will greatly increase the ability of the United States to develop an Islamic cordon sanitaire to deny the Soviet Union new opportunities in the Islamic world. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 178)

and index, \$14.95.)

Norman Stillman details the complex relationship between Jews and Arabs from the time of Muhammad to the middle of the last century.

WORLD POLITICS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. Edited by Robert O. Freedman. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1979. 344 pages, appendices and index, \$28.50.)

(Continued on page 186)

Erratum: The editors regret that David Eugene Blank's university affiliation was listed incorrectly on page 71 of the February, 1980, issue of *Current History*. He is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.

THE ISLAMIC PAST AND THE PRESENT RESURGENCE

(Continued from page 148)

who opposed the compromises made by reformist leaders and conservative ulama. Even before the challenge of the West was clear, fundamentalists were active in condemning the failure of eighteenth century Muslims to adhere strictly to the Qur'an and the Sunna. In the Arabian Peninsula, the banner of fundamentalist militancy was raised by Muhammad ibn Adb al-Wahhab, an Islamic scholar in the tradition of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. His followers, often called the Wahhabis, created a new state in Arabia built on a strict adherence to the rules of Islam. Elsewhere in the Islamic world, fundamentalists were active in using the Qur'an and the Sunna to condemn current practices of rulers and the general population.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the position of the fundamentalists has been unchanged. When compromises by Muslims appear to threaten the basic Islamic identity of society, they call for a reaffirmation of the timeless truth of Islam. This protest has taken many forms. In relatively isolated areas, fundamentalist states have been established. This was true in the Arabian Peninsula where a descendant of the founders of the Wahhabi state established the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In other areas, non-government associations were formed. Among the best known of these are the Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, the Jamaat-i-Islami of Mawlana Abdul Ala Mawdudi in India and then Pakistan, and the Fedayan Islam of Mulla Kashani in Iran.

In the days of nationalist struggle against European imperialism and the popular socialist solutions to developmental problems, fundamentalist groups were often regarded as anti-progressive elements. However, by the 1970's this was changing. Neither radical socialism nor Westernizing secularism had solved the problems of Islamic societies. There was a growing feeling that it was time to stop borrowing foreign ideas. Instead, a growing number of Muslims turned for inspiration to their own Islamic tradition. This was encouraged by the visible influence and prosperity of the strongest fundamentalist state, Saudi Arabia. Additional impetus came from the success of a revolutionary alternative that is both radical and fundamentalist in tone. An example of this can be seen in the revolutionary regime in Libya, which overthrew a conservative Islamic monarchy in 1969.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF SHI'ISM

In the development of modern Islam the Shi'a experience has been distinctive. Shi'a imams failed to win control of the Islamic community, and Shi'a

Muslims came to believe that at some point the line of imams had been interrupted when an imam went into divinely ordained seclusion. While some Shi'a feel that it was the seventh imam who went into seclusion, most believe that the twelfth in the line went into seclusion in the ninth century. In the absence of the imam, the Shi'a believe that any government is at best a temporary expedient. Thus within Shi'ism a potential conflict in principle developed between the institutions of religion and the state. This is in contrast to the Sunni political context where Sunni ulama (both conservative and fundamentalist) might disagree with individual rulers but will accept political institutions as a part of the division of labor in Islamic society.

Shi'a revolutionary movements have emerged to challenge Sunni control from time to time. In Iran, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the creators of the Safavid empire established Shi'a Islam as the official religion of the state and succeeded in converting the majority of Iranians. Safavid leaders were not recognized as imams and there was thus a potential tension between the religious teachers and the political rulers. The Shi'a ulama of Iran saw themselves as the spokesmen for the secluded imam and the protectors of Islam. When rulers stepped beyond the bounds of what the ulama thought proper, the ulama mobilized opposition and usually succeeded in limiting the initiatives of the rulers.

In the modern era, the adaptationist policies of Iranian shahs frequently aroused ulama opposition. Ulama desires to limit the powers of the shah encouraged popular support of opposition movements on a number of occasions (including opposition to a concession to a Western company in the late nineteenth century), and led to the overthrow of Mohammed Shah Riza Pahlavi in 1978-1979.

In this opposition role the Shi'a ulama of Iran have often functioned as fundamentalists, but with a difference. Reflecting the personalized focus of Shi'a Islam, the role of the individual religious teachers is greater than it is in Sunni fundamentalism. Some leading Shi'a ulama have become widely known for their piety and understanding and are recognized as special guides for believers. These men are called "Signs of God," or ayatollahs. When an ayatollah is a militant activist rather than a conservative, a personalized style of fundamentalism emerges. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is such a leader in modern Iran.

THE CONTEMPORARY RESURGENCE

The contemporary resurgence has roots in the experience of the Islamic community. Clearly, conditions in the second half of the twentieth century differ from those of earlier eras. The vast oil revenues available to some Islamic countries are an important new factor. Modernization challenges the Islamic tradition.

In the Islamic community, the message of the Qur'an and the Sunna is relevant to the political life of the community and to the devotional life of the individual. As a result, the rulers' adaptations to changing circumstances are judged in light of Islamic fundamentals. When such adaptations appear to go beyond acceptable Islamic limits, fundamentalist reaction takes place. Depending on the local conditions and the perceptions of the people involved, this can result in political revolution or in less militant adjustments. In every instance, Islam was and is an important element in the politics of the Islamic world.

It should be remembered, however, that there is great diversity in Muslim thought and action. Islam's intellectual and political leadership has adapted to a broad range of changing circumstances. In this sense, there is no inherent contradiction between the broader Islamic tradition and efforts to modernize. The readiness of Islamic communities to adopt new techniques and technologies is part of the historical record. However, equally clear is their firm resolve to maintain a distinctive Islamic identity in accord with the message of the Qur'an. Whenever this resolve appears to be undermined by modern adaptations, Muslims adopt a more fundamentalist style to reaffirm the validity of Islam.

The major challenge of the modern world is secularization. It is not possible to be an "Islamic secularist"; and yet some Muslims believe that secularization is an inherent part of modernization. The Islamic revival challenges that assumption. In a variety of contexts ranging from the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula to the modernist adaptations of Egypt and the more radical experiments of Islamic republics in Libya and Iran, Muslims are working to create societies that are clearly Islamic and at the same time are effective participants in the modern world. ■

ISLAM: THREAT TO ASEAN REGIONAL UNITY?

(Continued from page 153)

the martial law government of President Ferdinand Marcos is in its seventh year. This, too, is an exacerbation of a long-standing historical conflict. Just as the Sultans of Patani and Kelantan once ruled states spanning the present national border, the old Sulu Sultanate once controlled much of Mindanao and the islands of the Sulu Sea. Part of this territory included much of the coastline of the present Malaysian state of Sabah. Today, the descendants of those sturdy and fiercely independent sea rovers are the dominant Muslim community in Sabah.

¹⁶Rodney Tasker, "A Showpiece Faces Skepticism," *FEER*, May 11, 1979, pp. 19-20, and Sheila Ocampo, "Why the Water Banker Stood," *FEER*, May 18, 1979, pp. 16-22.

¹⁷Rodney Tasker, "Rebels Shift to New Targets," *FEER*, December 1, 1978, pp. 22-24.

In the Philippines, the Moros (as the various Muslim ethnic groups of the region are called) have earned a reputation for tough resistance to outside (particularly Christian) influence. No Manila-based government, Spanish, American or Filipino, has ever succeeded in subduing the Moros. Even before the present insurgency began, the area was commonly described as "lawless"; and piracy, banditry, feuding and smuggling were and continue to be everyday ways of life. Conflicts have increased in recent decades as Christians have migrated into the region.

The Moros' acclaimed goal is regional autonomy, and with the escalation of conflict in the region they have been joined by some Christians. While Islamic fundamentalism does not seem to be an element of their movement, they have received important support from Middle Eastern states. The main rebel organization, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), has been bank-rolled by Libya; another group, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) is supported by Saudi Arabia. Until 1975, arms and aid came through Sabah, and Tun Mustapha Harun, the Sabah Chief Minister, served as a conduit for outside aid before his fall from power. It was said that he entertained dreams of leading Sabah out of the Malaysian Federation and annexing the southern Philippines to form a new state with himself as sultan.

With Middle Eastern aid, insurgency mounted through 1975. The situation stabilized somewhat with Arab attempts at mediation, and President Marcos and the rebel leaders signed an agreement in December, 1976, in which Moro autonomy was promised. However, neither a plebiscite held in April, 1977, nor a regional assembly election in May, 1979, were accepted as sincere efforts by the MNLF leaders and their Arab supporters. In June, the Islamic Conference (IC) at its meeting in Fez, Morocco, pledged to replenish its "special fund for the moral and material support of the rebel movement." Although the amount was not mentioned, the 46-nation group gave the MNLF \$1.5 million in 1978.¹⁶

The war has had a devastating effect on the entire Sulu region. It is costing the government one million pesos (\$137,000) per day to continue the war. The government has lost 5,000 men fighting the 20,000-man Bangsa Moro Army; there have been 60,000 civilian casualties and more than a million have been made homeless. Nearly 200,000 refugees have fled into neighboring Sabah. In November, 1978, fighting broke out on Palawan Island, near the site of the Philippines' first oil field. There are also reports that the MNLF has formed tactical alliances with the Communist New Peoples Army (NPA), which has established a stronghold in Samar Island just to the north of Mindanao.¹⁷

The Philippine situation is a crisis in the making for Washington. United States President Jimmy Carter is

now asking Congress for a Philippine aid package of \$157.7 million. The continued status of the two large American bases there, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base, depend largely on the tolerance of the Marcos regime. Further deterioration of the situation would not only affect United States security concerns immediately, but because of the ethnic and religious ramifications of the Moro conflict, the stability of the ASEAN bloc would be severely shaken.

Currently, all the ASEAN governments continue to hold the balance of power in their respective states. In each case, however, Islam presents a new area of increasing tension, both internally and externally, and the prospects for continued stability are becoming slimmer. Thailand is preoccupied with the Indochina situation; Marcos is distracted by the growing resistance of the NPA and the results of his own failing economic policy. Soon the time will come when Malaysian and Indonesian governments will have to decide whether to accommodate or further repress their own Islamic militants. While that time may be several years in the future, it seems clear that Islam will play a significant role. ■

ISLAMIC AFFINITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

(Continued from page 158)

Al-Ansar and Khatmiyya leaders amassed enormous wealth and lands, which have been planted in export crops by their followers, giving them socioeconomic as well as religious-political authority.

Al-Ansar formed the Umma party (1944), and the Mirghani family founded the People's Democratic party (PDP, 1956), when it appeared that the leader of the National Union party, al-Azhari, wished to establish a secular state. The Umma and PDP coalition governed Sudan from independence in 1956 to 1958, when Umma-PDP conflicts and fear of Egyptian intervention led the leaders of the two brotherhoods to sanction a military coup by General Abboud.

The religious orders and the Sudan government determined that the Sudan should establish a national identity drawing on Islam and the Arabic language. The attempt to impose both religion and language on the African southern provinces led to increasing repression in the south and finally to a violent secessionist movement, led by the Anya-Nya. The Sudan's Arab army was incapable of suppressing this movement and the rebellion provided continuous conflict in Sudanese politics. The leaders of al-Ansar and the Khatmiyya were opposed to any move to permit secession or to give internal autonomy to the south, which would halt the spread of the faith.

Growing discontent with the military rule of General Abboud led to a popular insurrection against the military in 1964, led by liberal and radical urban

elements—teachers, students, workers and civil servants—and supported by al-Ansar and the Khatmiyya. Radical and secular elements at first controlled the government but were ousted by demonstrations and then elections, opening the way for conflict between more secular Arab nationalists and the leaders of the religious brotherhoods. Conflict culminated in the alignment of radical nationalist officers, led by Colonel Gaafar Nimeiri, the Communist party, and others of secular Arab nationalist persuasion, who supported a coup d'état by Nimeiri in 1969.

The chief cement of this unstable coalition was opposition to the continued power of the traditionalist al-Ansar and the Khatmiyya, which had repeatedly shown a capacity to mobilize their followers for elections or demonstrations. Al-Ansar supporters rose against Nimeiri's government in March, 1970; the government violently repressed the rising and led an assault on the Aba Island center of al-Ansar, which led to the death of the Imam and the flight abroad of Sadiq al-Mahdi. From abroad, with the help of the Libyans, he has initiated repeated coup attempts and uprisings against Nimeiri's regime.

Nimeiri split with and severely repressed the Communist party in 1971 after Communist officers sought to overthrow him. Then, in order to develop broader support, he reversed some of his radical policies, made peace with the southern Anya-Nya rebellion by offering internal autonomy, and opened the Sudan Socialist Union and National Assembly to the participation of traditional ethnic and other leaders. However, Nimeiri was plagued by internal and external dissidence during the 1970's and increasingly looked to the oil-rich Arab states (as has Egypt) for economic assistance. Saudia Arabia's price was reconciliation with al-Ansar and the Khatmiyya, a reconciliation which in 1977 led to an amnesty for Nimeiri's traditionalist opponents and the return of Sadiq al-Mahdi from exile. While al-Ansar and Khatmiyya leaders have acquired no official government positions, Nimeiri has been obliged to allow a public reassertion of Islam and the appointment of various religious leaders to committees to reexamine the Sudan's laws in order to bring them into conformity with Shari'a law. This has led to both urban and southern opposition, and the conflict will doubtless continue.

CHAD

Space permits only brief mention of the political role of Islam in Chad and Ethiopia-Eritrea. Chad is a poor, landlocked, half desert country in the center of Africa. About 46 percent of its population of 4.2 million regard themselves as Arabs and perhaps 50-55 percent are Muslim and speak Arabic. But Chad has been ruled since 1960 by the southern, black African, animist and Christian peoples, predominantly the Sara ethnic group (about 20 percent of the popu-

lation). Considerable racial intermixture does not disguise the fact that the Arab Muslims and the black African animist/Christians are different in culture, language, religion and recent history; Arabs traditionally regarded the Africans with scorn and engaged in the slave trade.

Arab representation in the government was denied and the Arab-Muslim party was banned in 1962; Arab leaders were arrested in 1963. Lack of Arab Muslim representation, oppression by the Sara-led government, and excessive taxation on the livestock herds of the Muslims led to the outbreak of a rebellion in 1965, which by 1968 had escalated to civil war. Subsequently the government lost control over much of its territory, despite French military assistance. The Front of the National Liberation of Chad (Frolinat) was aided by Libya during the 1970's, but it split into innumerable factions, in large measure because of Libyan insistence on dominating the leadership and seeking recognition of its claim to the mineral-rich Aouzou strip of northern Chad that it has occupied since 1973.

By the end of 1979, after an intense civil conflict that destroyed the country and caused the slaughter of thousands of Muslims in the south, an interim national government was formed, including 11 distinct political-military factions. The Cabinet is composed of 10 African and 12 Arab Muslim leaders. Neutral troops from Guinea, the Congo and Benin occupy the capital, Ndjamena, to prevent Frolinat factions from fighting one another and the remnants of Chad's army. The hopes for peace lie in the leadership of President Goukhouani Woddei (former Frolinat leader and spiritual head of the Toubou), the recognition of Chad's devastated state, and the need to unite to repel Libya's increasing invasions of Chad's northern area.

ETHIOPIA

The rule of Emperor Haile Selassie and the Coptic Christian Amharic aristocracy in Ethiopia was finally ended by a combination military coup and revolution in 1974. The 40 percent of the population that is Muslim and has long been exploited (its lands seized, its religion unrecognized) sought political and social recognition. But Muslim rights, like those of many other sectors (but not all, e.g., the peasants), have been denied by the Dergue's revolutionary authoritarianism. Somalia invaded Ethiopia's Ogaden province in late 1977, trying to make this area of Somali-speaking Muslims a part of Somalia. But this effort was defeated by mid-1978.

Eritrea, divided between highland Tigrinya-speaking Christians and lowland Arab-speaking Muslims, was an Italian colony controlled by the British after World War II. Forcibly federated with Ethiopia in 1952, Eritreans continued to enjoy internal autonomy

and democratic institutions. Ethiopia dissolved the federation in 1962 and subjected the Muslims to its Christian autocracy. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) originated as a predominantly Muslim insurrectionary secessionist movement. It later acquired more radical urban and Christian support; this group split in 1970 to form an Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The ELF's struggle was supported by many Arab Muslim states, who regarded it as an Arab liberation movement, and by some Communist countries. The ELF-EPLF were on the verge of controlling all of Eritrea by mid-1978, when Soviet-Cuban support for Ethiopia's army led to ELF-EPLF reverses. Muslim states remain the sole supporters of the ELF-EPLF's continuing struggle.

ASYMMETRICAL POWER: AFRICAN-ARAB RELATIONS

The intervention of Arab and African states has been a by-product of the politicization of Islam in Africa. The Arab Muslim states have become heavily involved, not solely or simply because of religious ties. The radical and conservative Arab states have sought to bolster their regional power by manipulating African political conflicts. In large measure because of their new oil wealth, Arab states have become very unequal partners in their relationships with African states. Two examples will suffice: Libya's interventions in Africa and the Arab-African diplomatic alliance.

Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi has created a revolutionary role for himself in Libya, but his interventions in African states have frequently reflected Libya's material interests and Qaddafi's anger at those who frustrated his will. The fact that Colonel Qaddafi associates Christianity in Africa with imperialism, and Islam with a cultural revolution against imperialism, does not make him a radical. Libya has sought by diplomatic, economic and military means to expand Libya's influence in all the sub-Saharan states on Libya's southern border (Niger, Chad, Sudan) and several others (Central African Republic, Uganda). Qaddafi's anger with Colonel Nimeiri of the Sudan for his preference for Egypt rather than Libya induced him to finance an attempt by the conservative Ansar leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, to overthrow Nimeiri's regime in 1976. Libya's support for the Frolinat rebels against the Chad government can be explained in terms of his support for Arabs and Muslims against a neocolonial client state of France, but Libya's manipulation of support among Frolinat leaders and its occupation of vast areas of northern Chad, thought to possess uranium and phosphates, suggest Libya's real interests, especially since at one point Qaddafi was also willing to support African leaders who opposed Frolinat. Libya has produced maps that shift significant parts of Chad, Niger and Algeria to Libya. Libya has avoided the sustained protests of African states

against its incursions and has prevented Organization of African Unity (OAU) condemnation by regularly promising aid. African Presidents and finance ministers have traveled to Tripoli in one long caravan in search of Libyan aid, which is announced readily but dispensed with painful slowness. Qaddafi apparently made an arrangement with the conservative President Hamani Diori of Niger, promising economic and military assistance in exchange for Libyan access to Niger's uranium deposits. Profoundly disappointed by the military coup that removed Diori from power in 1974, Libya gave military support to an abortive coup against Niger's President (General) Senyi Kountche in March, 1976. Libya's riches so beguiled "Emperor" Jean Bedel Bokassa of the Central African "Empire" that at one point he briefly converted to Islam to consolidate his link with Libya. Apparently when the French learned that Bokassa was in Tripoli, arranging a deal with Qaddafi that would have given Libya major military facilities in the Central African Empire, France moved quickly to overthrow Bokassa in September, 1979. (Such an arrangement would have seriously threatened France's strategic ties with its former colonies in Africa.)

The movement toward an Arab-African diplomatic alliance quickened in 1967 (after the Arab-Israeli war) and culminated at the time of the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli conflict, with 18 African states breaking relations with Israel. In September, 1973, at the 4th Non-Aligned Summit Conference 34 African states and 18 Arab states had condemned Israeli and Zionist aggression, a position later reiterated at United Nations and OAU meetings. The roots of this alliance lay in intense Arab diplomacy in Africa after 1966-1967, coupled with Saudi Arabian and (especially) Libyan use of petrodollars to induce financially precarious African states to sever relations with Israel (e.g., Uganda, Niger, Mali, Chad, Congo, Senegal and Burundi), Israel's arms trade with South Africa, Arab "success" in the 1973 war and, of great importance, the Arab-OPEC 70 percent oil price increase and the Arab oil embargo announcement in October, 1973. African states responded to the blunt Arab threats and to promises and hopes for extensive Arab aid and concessional oil prices.

Most power in the Arab-African diplomatic alliance is held by the rich Arab oil states, and the benefits from the highly touted alliance have rebounded principally to the Arab states, primarily in terms of their ability successfully to orchestrate an anti-Israeli position in most international bodies and to avoid public African opposition to OPEC's monopolistic cartel and successive oil price increases. Since 1973-1974 these price increases have stunted the economic growth of many African states and have

generated enormous inflation, crippling balance of payments deficits, and incredible external indebtedness.

The relatively low level of Arab country aid, the flow of such aid primarily to Muslim African states (mostly North African), the unwillingness of Arab (and the three African) oil producers to give concessional oil prices to the impoverished African states, and the continual oil price increases after 1973-1974 raised sharp frictions between Arab and African states by 1977. Although the Arab and OPEC states established a range of aid institutions, these have only minimally compensated non-Arab League African states for oil price increases. During 1974, eight non-oil producing Arab and African Muslim states received 90 percent of Arab bilateral concessional aid, in 1975, 87 percent. Five Muslim states of 12 African states that received non-concessional aid received 85 percent of the 1974-1975 total. In 1973-1975 African members of the Arab League (only three of which are sub-Saharan states) received 90 percent of all OPEC aid going to less developed African countries; 74 percent went to Egypt. Only in the funds primarily contributed by OPEC states to the International Monetary Fund's special Oil Facility were non-Arab League African states major beneficiaries.³

In consequence, the Arab African diplomatic alliance has witnessed increasing strains, with African states painfully aware that they face a new political-economic dependence on the oil-rich Arab states. Muslim states are favored by Arab largesse. Many African states perceive few political or economic options and can only hope to mount pressure of varying effectiveness for greater Arab aid. ■

MUSLIM MINORITIES UNDER NON-ISLAMIC RULE

(Continued from page 164)

success story, something to be proud of. Moreover, the establishment of Islamic conferences, which have been convening annually since 1969, has lent a new impetus to popular if not political pan-Islamic sentiments. One may conjecture that the current Islamic impulse that has affected the length and breadth of the Islamic world will enhance the self-image of Muslim minorities everywhere, as has already been true in Cyprus, Israel, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma and other places. Muslim minorities across the globe are becoming more and more self-conscious, and mosques are sprouting in non-Muslim sites like Washington, London, Geneva and Seoul on an unprecedented scale and with untold splendour. Muslim minorities will become more and more aware of the legendary wealth and oil power wielded by Islamic countries, some of which, like Libya, have been backing Muslim separatist movements in Thailand and the Philippines. They will take a new look at the

³Data from Victor LeVine and T. Luke, *The Arab-African Connection* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 12-23.

most powerful Islamic state, Saudi Arabia, where the Holy Places of Islam are located and where local sherifs claim descent from the Prophet himself. The Holy Pilgrimage (hajj) will probably gain a new impetus; a growing number of Muslim pilgrims will make the journey to Mecca. For the first time, in 1979, even Israeli Muslims were allowed by the Saudis to join their brethren in the exhilarating Islamic experience of the Hajj.

In recent years, the enhanced stature of Islam has led the Muslim center to take a keener and deeper interest in the minorities on its periphery. This renewed interest manifests itself in the information printed in the Arabic press about Muslims in other lands, and particularly in the resolutions of the Islamic conferences, which have been bringing under one roof delegates from some 40-odd Muslim countries and organizations representing over 600 million faithful. Thus Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos recognized the Islamic conferences as a partner for negotiating the autonomy of the Moros. Other resolutions of that conference favored the Muslim community of Cyprus over the Christian Greeks and vowed the "liberation of Jerusalem" and support for the Palestinian Muslim cause.

Today's pro-Arab ambience in the world also generates a universal reluctance to antagonize Muslims. This is all the more true since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, because the two world blocs cater to Muslim nations in order to attract them to their cause. Thus countries with sizable Muslim minorities will probably make an effort to liberalize their minority policy, taking the risk that more leeway for Muslim minorities might generate demands for autonomy.

THE MYTH OF ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

(Continued from page 168)

importance in our national life. Our people are very religious. . . . I don't think any Muslim country has such a large number of mosques. We are modernizing and rehabilitating madrasas (Islamic high schools). We are going to have an Islamic university in our country.⁹

The new constitution, however, is explicit about protecting the rights of the minority 15 percent, most of whom are Hindus. Secular law prevails in criminal and civil matters, except where religious law supercedes it, as in personal family matters. In personal matters, the religious system of the individual con-

cerned is consulted. For example, bigamy is forbidden in civil law, but this applies only to Christian men and to all women, since Muslim and Hindu men are permitted multiple wives according to their religious laws. Thus minority Hindus and Christians are not subject to Islamic laws, but Muslim Bangladeshis are.¹⁰ This ingenious formulation protects minority rights while at the same time acknowledging the law of the Muslim majority.

Apparently this formula has mollified many Islamic nations that did not recognize Bangladesh under the Mujib regime. Since 1975, Dacca has established formal diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan and other Muslim nations. There is reason to believe that Bangladesh has been under some pressure from Saudi Arabia to become the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh and to adopt Shari'a law as Pakistan has done. So far Zia has managed to maintain good relations with the Muslim world without taking this step. Indeed, as of December, 1979, Saudi Arabia was the fourth largest donor of aid to Bangladesh.

Since becoming a rotating member of the Security Council in 1978, Bangladesh has been especially careful to cultivate studied nonalignment. Dacca has formal diplomatic relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and participated actively in the 1979 Havana summit of nonaligned states. Yet Bangladesh voted with the rest of the Security Council to condemn the taking of American hostages in Teheran, although it abstained on the vote for economic sanctions against Iran. Finally, Bangladesh (along with Pakistan) played a leading role in drafting a resolution deploring the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and getting that resolution passed in the General Assembly after the Soviet Union vetoed it in the Security Council.¹¹

In general, then, the mid-1970's saw Bangladesh assert its Islamic identity, but on a muted level. Although Bengali Muslims are deeply religious, they show no indication of wanting to impose Islamic law on non-Muslim minorities in Bangladesh. What is happening in Bangladesh today is not a resurgence of militant Islamic fervor but a mature redefinition of itself as a Muslim nation engaged in the perilous process of modernization and determined not to lose itself in that process.

CONCLUSIONS

The Muslim nations of southern Asia are engaged in the dual task of self-definition and solving their socioeconomic, military and political problems. For decades they struggled with these problems within the context of the cold war, forced to choose (directly or indirectly) between either socialism or capitalism. At last these nations have recognized that both socialism and capitalism are alien social structures that have

⁹Rodney Tasker's interview with President Ziaur Rahman, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 12, 1979, p. 31.

¹⁰*Revised Constitution and Civil and Criminal Codes of Bangladesh*, Dacca, 1979.

¹¹Text of the resolution reprinted in *The New York Times*, January 15, 1980, p. A8.

not and will not work for them. In attempting to discover an indigenous and effective social structure, third world nations are finding that all that is left to them is their religion and their remote past, because the present and the recent past has been dominated by alien ideas. Although the people never abandoned or even strayed far from their religion and its implied social modes, the leadership had attempted to mold societies into foreign structures.

In Afghanistan, the government of Babrak Karmal continues this alien policy with the help of Soviet troops, but the Afghans themselves, especially the tribesmen in remoter outlying regions, find the situation untenable. In Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq is attempting to bring the government into line with Islamic Shari'a to gain the support of other Islamic nations and the devoutly Muslim Pakistanis themselves. In Bangladesh, President Ziaur Rahman is attempting the same thing on a more moderate scale. Despite the murder of United States Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul in February, 1979, and the brief forays against the United States embassies in Islamabad and Dacca, what is happening in these countries is not a resurgence of Islamic fervor leading to jihad, or holy war against the infidels, but rather a desperate attempt at self-definition in a world where the powerless are too often defined in terms of the powerful. Thus, despite Khomeini's charge, the United States is not viewed as a Satanic infidel, but rather as the symbol of the powerful, antithetical to their own powerlessness.

It would be a grave error for American foreign policymakers to misinterpret this phenomenon. For too long the West did not pay sufficient attention to the political power of Islam. Then, with the oil crisis and the revolution in Iran, political analysts suddenly reversed course and began to talk of the resurgence of a hostile and fundamentalist Islam on a global level. Just as the earlier position was injurious because it inhibited full awareness of the nature of politics in Islamic nations, this newer explanation harbors equally serious pitfalls. For Western analysts may try to trace political activism to Islamic sources, rather than recognizing it as a struggle for self-definition and power. Just as American foreign policymakers previously ignored the possibility that political power may have a religious basis, they are in danger of ignoring the political basis of what appears to be religious power. ■

THE MUSLIM MINORITY IN THE SOVIET UNION

(Continued from page 177)

Azerbaijan and the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and North West Frontier who are fighting for their freedom and want outside help to become independ-

ent. The Soviets are willing to offer such assistance and will do so at an opportune time. Their invasion of Afghanistan has strengthened Soviet authority, externally and vis-à-vis the Muslims in the Soviet Union. By helping the ethnic groups in turbulent Iran and troubled Pakistan, Soviet leaders will add to their authority in the Islamic belt in Southwest Asia.

CONCLUSIONS

Have the efforts of the past 62 years (1917-1979) to destroy the religious loyalties and the supranational consciousness of the Muslims produced positive and lasting results? There is no doubt that Islam no longer regulates the daily life of people in the Soviet Union, even if the Islamic faith still retains its hold on the minds of believers.

The Soviet authorities have tried to protect the Muslim minority against outside influence by providing Soviet Muslims with a cultural outlook and literary language different from those employed beyond Soviet frontiers. Such a policy seems to have had as a result the isolation of the Muslims of the U.S.S.R. from their coreligionists in neighboring countries.

Before the 1917 Communist revolution, in spite of its apparent unity the Muslim community was only a mosaic of peoples and tribes who, for the most part, had not yet reached the capitalist stage and were united only by a common Islamic faith and pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic aspirations. In fact, each Muslim group lived in a closed world, isolated not only from the Russians but also from its own coreligionists. In the Muslim territories, the socialist system has led to the standardization of various ways of life, and the disappearance of differences among various nomadic people. The Communist regime put an end to rivalries and national antagonisms. Lastly, the system has suppressed the cultural particularism of religious and ethnic minorities and has brought into being a national consciousness in ecopolitical and social fields.

Unable to stamp out Islamic traditions, Soviet leaders have finally been forced into a compromise with Islam, allowing the religion to survive, although it is officially discouraged. Many Muslims maintain an atheistic posture in public while they practice their religion in private. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 179)

PALESTINIANS: FROM PEASANTS TO REVOLUTIONARIES. *By Rosemary Sayigh.* (London: Zed Press, 1979. 206 pages, glossary and bibliography, \$6.95, paper, \$17.95, cloth.)

THE ARAB NATION. *By Samir Amin.* (London: Zed Press, 1978. 116 pages, references and notes, \$4.95, paper, \$12.75, cloth.) ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of February, 1980, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Afghanistan Crisis

Feb. 2—U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., estimate that the Soviet Union has suffered about 2,500 casualties since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Feb. 3—In Islamabad, Pakistan, Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq says that U.S. security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski promised him that U.S. forces would come to the defense of Pakistan in the event of a Soviet attack.

The Soviet Union begins to receive double the amount of natural gas it formerly received from Afghanistan; a gas field in northern Afghanistan (under construction by Soviet technicians for 3 years) begins operating.

Feb. 4—In Chaman, Pakistan, Soviet troops are reported with Afghan troops on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Feb. 5—It is reported in New Delhi that Afghan rebels in northeast Badakhshan Province are mounting well-armed attacks against Soviet forces.

In Paris, at the conclusion of their semiannual talks, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing issue a joint communiqué calling for the immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Feb. 8—In Paris, the government of President Giscard announces that it will not send a representative to the meeting of Western foreign ministers suggested by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance yesterday to discuss the crisis in Afghanistan. As a result of the French decision, the meeting is cancelled.

Feb. 15—In Washington, D.C., a White House spokesman says that the U.S. government is supplying light infantry equipment to Afghan insurgents via Pakistan.

Feb. 21—In Kabul, merchants close their businesses to protest the Soviet presence.

Afghan guerrillas close the road between Kabul and Jalalabad.

Feb. 22—In Kabul, mass demonstrations throughout the city protest the Soviet presence; the Soviet-backed government declares martial law.

In a televised speech, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev says that Soviet forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan when the U.S. and Afghanistan's neighbors guarantee to end "all forms of outside interference."

Feb. 23—In a show of strength, Soviet jet fighter planes and helicopters fly over Kabul; Afghan Army units and armed activists of the People's Democratic party patrol the streets as quiet is restored.

Feb. 24—In Kabul, sporadic fighting continues between Soviet troops and Muslim guerrillas. More than 300 people are reported to have been killed in the last several days.

In Islamabad, Afghan refugees report the death of Afghan Second Deputy Prime Minister Sultan Ali Kistmand during the recent fighting.

Feb. 26—In a letter to Yugoslav President Tito, U.S. President Jimmy Carter says the U.S. will join with other nations, including the U.S.S.R., to guarantee the neutrality of Afghanistan if Soviet troops are withdrawn.

Reports from New Delhi indicate that Muslim Shi'ites

in Kabul have been arrested for provoking anti-Soviet demonstrations.

Feb. 28—It is reported from Kabul that most civil servants and merchants have returned to work.

In London, the British Foreign Ministry gives Soviet Ambassador Nikolai M. Lunkov a proposal for the neutralization of Afghanistan.

European Economic Community (EEC)

Feb. 19—Meeting in Rome, the EEC Foreign Ministers propose that Afghanistan be declared a neutral country, provided the Soviet Union withdraws its troops under international guarantees. The ministers do not endorse U.S. President Jimmy Carter's call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games.

International Labor Organization (ILO)

(See U.S., Foreign Policy)

Iran Crisis

Feb. 3—Iran's President-elect Abolhassan Bani-Sadr says that the U.S. must publicly denounce its actions in Iran and must help arrange for the return to Iran of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi and his fortune in exchange for the release of the U.S. hostages.

Feb. 6—In Panama City, Panama's Foreign Minister Carlos Ozores says that the Shah may not voluntarily leave the country and that he is "under the custody of the National Guard."

Feb. 10—In Teheran, 49 Americans are permitted to interview the militants at the occupied U.S. embassy; they are not permitted to see the hostages. The militants are criticized by Bani-Sadr for not acting through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Feb. 11—Bani-Sadr says that the U.S. hostages may be released shortly if Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the U.S. accept a compromise formula now under consideration. The proposal asks the U.S. to admit its "crimes" in Iran during the last 25 years and to acknowledge Iran's right to demand the extradition of the Shah and the return of his fortune.

Bani-Sadr says Iran is prepared to submit Iran's case to an international commission established by the U.N. to investigate the crimes of the Shah.

Feb. 13—U.S. President Jimmy Carter approves the establishment of a "carefully defined" international commission to inquire into Iranian grievances against the U.S. and Iran's deposed Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi.

Bani-Sadr says that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has approved a plan that will end in the release of the American hostages.

Feb. 15—In New York, U.S. District Court Judge Kevin T. Duffy orders the contents of all briefs in suits being filed against the Iranian government to be sealed because of the delicate situation of the American hostages in Teheran.

Feb. 17—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim completes the formation of a commission to investigate the activities of the deposed Shah; the members of the commission are Adib Daoudy of Syria, political adviser

to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; Louis-Edmond Petiti, a French judge on the European Court of Human Rights; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algerian envoy to the U.N.; Andres Aguilar, former Venezuelan ambassador to the U.S.; and Harry W. Jayewardene, a human rights activist and lawyer in Sri Lanka.

Feb. 19—Bani-Sadr approves the composition of the commission; the U.S. has already given its approval.

Feb. 21—The militants holding the hostages demand the Shah's return to Iran before the hostages are released.

Feb. 23—The U.N.-appointed commission arrives in Teheran.

In Teheran, Ayatollah Khomeini says the commission's report will be only the first step toward the release of the hostages; the issue will not be considered until the new Parliament meets in April.

Feb. 24—In Teheran, the commission members meet with President Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh.

Feb. 25—U.S. State Department officials insist privately that the U.S. would not have agreed to the beginning of work by the U.N.'s Iran commission without the "clearest expectations" that the U.S. hostages would be set free before the conclusion of the investigation.

Feb. 27—Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, secretary of the Revolutionary Council, declares that the question of releasing the U.S. hostages cannot be discussed by Parliament until May.

U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance says the U.N. fact-finding commission went to Iran to try to obtain "the speedy release of the hostages."

Middle East

(See also *Israel*)

Feb. 1—U.S. President Jimmy Carter's special Mideast envoy Sol M. Linowitz says that Egypt and Israel have agreed to a package deal for a self-governing council on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip.

Feb. 26—The governments of Egypt and Israel exchange ambassadors. Saad Mortada is the Egyptian ambassador to Israel, and Eliahu Ben-Elissar is the Israeli ambassador to Egypt.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Feb. 7—In Addis Ababa, the OAU convenes its meeting 2 weeks ahead of schedule because of the Rhodesian tension; the secretary general of the organization, Edem Kodjo of Togo, says that the terms of the Rhodesian peace settlement must be respected.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Feb. 1—Nigeria raises the price of its most common oil to \$34.21 per barrel, effective February 4.

United Nations

(See *Intl. Iran Crisis; Cambodia*)

AFGHANISTAN

(See *Intl. Afghanistan Crisis*)

CAMBODIA

Feb. 10—At the U.N., head of the international relief effort for Cambodia James Grant says that famine has been averted at least temporarily. He warns that unless additional supplies are delivered within the next 4 months, another crisis will develop by the late summer or fall of 1980.

CANADA

Feb. 18—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held. The Liberal party, led by former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, wins 146 of the 282 seats in the House of Commons; the Progressive Conservative party of Prime Minister Joe Clark wins 103 seats; the New Democrats win 32.

CHAD

Feb. 16—Despite a February 5 deadline for the demilitarization of Ndjamena (the nation's capital) under an agreement for a provisional coalition government reached in August, 1979, fighting continues between forces loyal to Defense Minister Hissein Habré, a southern black Christian leader, and the forces of President Goukouni Oueddeï, a northern leader.

CHILE

Feb. 4—Following a Cabinet shuffle, the government-run universities discharge about 70 professors, most of whom have been critical of the economic policies of the government.

CHINA

Feb. 3—The *Beijing Daily* reports that the worst drought in 45 years has killed off most of the winter wheat in the Beijing area.

Feb. 8—In Beijing, the Vietnamese delegate to the China-Vietnam peace talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem, leaves for Hanoi, interrupting the peace talks indefinitely.

Feb. 19—The New China News Agency announces that Navy Commander Xiao Jingguang has been replaced by Y. Fei and that Commander Rao Shoukun has been transferred to the Jinan military region to replace Zeng Siyu.

Feb. 25—Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping resigns as Army Chief of Staff; Yang Dechi replaces him.

Feb. 29—The Communist party's Central Committee posthumously exonerates former Chief of State Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-chi).

COLOMBIA

Feb. 27—In Bogota, leftist guerrillas seize hostages, including the U.S. ambassador, at the embassy of the Dominican Republic.

Feb. 28—In Bogota, guerrillas release 13 hostages held in the embassy of the Dominican Republic; 67 hostages remain. The rebels are demanding the release of political prisoners and \$50 million in ransom.

Feb. 29—Terrorists at the Dominican embassy release the 5 remaining female hostages; they continue to hold the Papal Nuncio and 14 foreign ambassadors.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl. Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 5—Parliament repeals a 1955 law that imposed sanctions against Israel and any companies that did business with Israel.

EL SALVADOR

Feb. 5—In San Salvador, militant leftists belonging to the Popular Leagues of February 28 take over the Spanish embassy; they demand the release of political prisoners.

Feb. 18—Members of the National Teachers Association seize the offices of the Education Ministry in San

Salvador and hold more than 200 people hostage; 200 hostages seized earlier this month at the city's administrative offices have reportedly been released.

Militants relinquish control of the Spanish embassy.

Feb. 23—Attorney General and member of the Christian Democratic party Mario Zamora is assassinated by unidentified gunmen.

In Washington, D.C., a State Department spokesman says that the armed forces and their right-wing supporters have been warned by the U.S. against a coup d'etat.

Feb. 27—The U.S. signs an agreement to extend El Salvador \$9 million in loans; West Germany extended a \$5 million loan earlier this week; both loans are designed to strengthen El Salvador's economy.

FRANCE

(See *Intl. Afghanistan Crisis; Libya*)

GERMANY, WEST

Feb. 11—In Cologne, a federal court judge sentences 3 former members of the Nazi SS to jail sentences ranging from 6 to 12 years for their complicity in the deportation and murder of about 50,000 Jews from occupied France.

GUATEMALA

(See also *Spain*)

Feb. 5—Virgilio Vilagrán Bracamonte, head of the army's sports division, is assassinated.

ICELAND

Feb. 8—A coalition government headed by Gunnar Thoroddsen takes office; Thoroddsen, formerly of the Independence party, has formed a coalition government with the Communists, the centrist Progressive party and two independents.

INDIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 14—In New Delhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Soviet Minister Andrei A. Gromyko conclude 3 days of discussion on Indian-Soviet relations.

Feb. 17—Gandhi dissolves 9 state assemblies controlled by opposition parties; the assemblies will be controlled by the central government until new elections are held.

IRAN

(See also *Intl. Iran Crisis*)

Feb. 4—In his 1st comment on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini condemns the invasion and promises "unconditional support" for the Muslim guerrillas fighting the Soviets.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini administers the oath of office to Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who becomes the first President of the Republic of Iran.

Feb. 5—Bani-Sadr is named acting head of the Revolutionary Council.

Feb. 6—The Revolutionary Council sets March 7 as the date for the first round of parliamentary elections for the 270-member Assembly.

Feb. 7—Revolutionary Council spokesman Hassan Habibi announces that President Bani-Sadr will assume executive power.

The Revolutionary Council asks the state broadcasting system to refrain from automatically giving the militants air time.

Feb. 19—In a further consolidation of power, Ayatollah

Khomeini appoints Bani-Sadr commander in chief of the armed forces.

Feb. 26—The Revolutionary Council decides to allow approved foreign journalists to return to Iran.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. Middle East; Egypt; Lebanon*)

Feb. 10—The Cabinet votes in principle to permit Israelis to settle in central Hebron, an Arab city in the occupied West Bank area. Until now, Israelis have been allowed to settle only in vacant rural areas of the occupied West Bank.

Feb. 12—Military officials report that the Soviet Union is supplying Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces in southern Lebanon with tanks and other armored equipment.

U.S. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says the recent Israeli decision to permit Jews to settle in Hebron is a "step backward in the peace progress."

Feb. 17—The Cabinet postpones a decision on whether to permit ultra-nationalists to settle in Hebron.

Feb. 22—In an effort to curb the black market, the Cabinet makes the shekel the new unit of official currency, replacing the pound. Effective March 2, 1 shekel will be issued for every 10 pounds.

Defense Minister Ezer Weizman denies a U.S. press report that Israel detonated an atomic bomb in the south Atlantic in September, 1979.

Feb. 25—Finance Minister Yigael Hurwitz submits the government budget to Parliament; the budget calls for a 6 percent reduction in government spending on public services.

Feb. 29—Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the Labor government Yigal Allon dies of a heart attack.

JAPAN

Feb. 1—The Finance Ministry and the Bank of Japan announce a balance of payments deficit of \$8.64 billion for 1979 on a current account basis. In 1978, Japan had a balance of payments surplus of \$16.53 billion.

Feb. 24—In Yokosuka, more than 6,000 demonstrators stage a protest at the naval port; they oppose the recent government decision to permit the Japanese Navy to take part in naval exercises in the Central Pacific with U.S., Canadian, Australian and New Zealand forces.

KOREA, NORTH

(See *South Korea*)

KOREA, SOUTH

Feb. 19—In Panmunjom, representatives of North and South Korea discuss preparations for a meeting of their Prime Ministers.

Feb. 29—President Choi restores civil rights to 687 political activists who were deprived of their rights by the late President Park Chung Hee.

LEBANON

(See also *Israel*)

Feb. 4—In Damascus, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad announces that he will withdraw Syrian peacekeeping troops from Beirut within 36 hours; no reason is given for the sudden decision.

Following a hastily arranged meeting, Lebanese Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss secures President Assad's promise to delay the Syrian troop withdrawal.

Feb. 6—The government announces that Lebanese army

troops will replace Syrian peacekeeping troops when they withdraw.

Feb. 7—In Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin offers to support Lebanese Christians in southern Lebanon if they are endangered by the Syrian troop withdrawal.

Feb. 23—In Beirut, 8 people are killed in a bomb explosion apparently intended to assassinate right-wing Christian military commander Bachir Gemayel. Gemayel's daughter, his chauffeur and 2 bodyguards are among those killed when his limousine explodes.

Feb. 24—In Beirut, Lebanese official say that Syria has agreed to postpone its troops withdrawal indefinitely.

LIBYA

Feb. 4—In Tripoli, the French embassy is destroyed by demonstrators; they are protesting French aid to the Tunisian government to fight Libyan guerrillas who attacked the Tunisian town of Gafsa on January 26, 1980.

MEXICO

Feb. 18—In Mexico City, left-wing militants belonging to the National Democratic Popular Front occupy the Danish and Belgian embassies; they are demanding the release of political prisoners and information on the whereabouts of 600 people who have disappeared while in police custody.

NETHERLANDS

Feb. 20—Finance Minister Frans Andriessen submits his resignation in a Cabinet dispute over budget cuts.

PAKISTAN

(See *Intl. Afghanistan Crisis*)

PHILIPPINES

Feb. 6—Following opposition charges of electoral fraud in the recent elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos appoints a special investigatory commission.

Feb. 18—Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Ingles says his government has agreed to let the U.S. use its military bases in the Philippines as staging areas for U.S. Marines headed for the Arabian Gulf.

POLAND

Feb. 11—In Warsaw, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers party Edward Gierek addresses the opening session of the 8th party congress.

Feb. 15—Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz is dismissed from the Politburo and from his post as Prime Minister.

Feb. 18—A special session of Parliament elects Edward Babiuch to replace Jaroszewicz as Prime Minister.

RHODESIA

Feb. 3—16 black civilians are killed when their bus is ambushed; 24 people are wounded.

In London, *The Sunday Times* reports that the British government wiretapped telephones and bugged rooms of delegates to the 1979 constitutional conference.

Feb. 5—In an attempt to stem the growing violence between supporters of black nationalist leader Robert Mugabe and supporters of Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, colonial Governor Christopher Soames says he will bar from the election any parties or candidates who are intimidating the voters.

Feb. 8—Lord Soames appoints a special commission to assess the conditions for the elections; reports indicate that Robert Mugabe's forces have infiltrated the coun-

tryside and have made campaigning by other parties almost impossible.

Feb. 9—In Salisbury, former Prime Minister Garfield Todd is arrested for aiding terrorists by failing to report terrorist activity.

Feb. 10—In Fort Victoria, Robert Mugabe escapes an assassination attempt when a bomb explodes behind his car; this is the 2d attempt on his life in 4 days.

Feb. 25—In preparation for the new government, more than 600 guerrilla forces of Joshua Nkomo are sent to a military base to be retrained by British soldiers of the Commonwealth force.

Feb. 26—Lord Soames decides to allow all parties to participate in the elections that begin tomorrow.

Feb. 27—About 1 million blacks vote in the first day of Rhodesia's 3-day elections.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

SPAIN

(See also *El Salvador*)

Feb. 1—Following the seizure of the Spanish embassy in Guatemala in which 7 embassy staff members were killed, the government breaks diplomatic relations with Guatemala.

In Bilbao, 6 paramilitary civil guards are ambushed and killed by Basque separatists.

Feb. 28—In Andalusia, a referendum is held on regional home rule.

SUDAN

Feb. 4—President Gaafar al-Nimeiry dissolves Parliament and the parliament of Southern Sudan; he orders new elections for both houses within 60 days.

SURINAME

Feb. 25—Prime Minister Henck A. E. Arron is overthrown in a military coup d'etat; 6 people are reported killed.

Feb. 26—A nine-member National Military Council takes power; one or 2 civilians are members of the Council.

SYRIA

(See also *Lebanon*)

Feb. 2—In Aleppo, Sheik Mohammed Chami, a Sunni Muslim clergyman, is shot and killed in a mosque; the government accuses the Muslim Brotherhood of responsibility for the assassination.

Feb. 19—Finance Minister Hamdinal-Saqqa announces plans to increase military spending; the new plan allocates 55 percent of the total \$7-billion budget for military spending.

THAILAND

Feb. 11—In extensive Cabinet changes, Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand replaces Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun with Air Marshal Sithi Sawetsila and Interior Minister Lek Naeomali with Prathuang Kiratibut; Naeomali becomes Deputy Prime Minister.

TUNISIA

(See *Libya*)

TURKEY

Feb. 14—In Izmir, government forces put down the month-long occupation by militant workers of a state-owned factory; 1,500 workers are arrested.

Feb. 15—Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren

calls for more power for the security forces to put down terrorism.

Feb. 16—In Izmir, 3 policemen are killed and 7 are wounded in fighting with left-wing demonstrators.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl. Afghanistan Crisis; India; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 4—At a dinner in Moscow in honor of Cambodian President Heng Samrin, President Leonid I. Brezhnev says he wants to preserve the "good things" of détente and hopes to continue to make progress on containing the East-West arms race.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Rhodesia*)

Feb. 3—In London, 15,000 private sector steel workers join the month-long strike against the state-owned British Steel Corporation. More than 100,000 state workers have been on strike since January 2, 1980, to protest low wages.

Feb. 6—The Conservative party submits a bill to Parliament providing for the sale of 6 million municipally owned houses and apartments to tenants at reduced prices.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Feb. 1—The Energy Department makes public its 9-point oil rationing plan, to take effect in 30 days if the President declares an emergency. If the plan goes into effect, the President is empowered to order a shortened work week, severely limit auto and truck driving, lower speed limits below the current 55 miles an hour maximum speed, and adopt additional measures to conserve gas and oil.

Treasury Secretary G. William Miller says that while he was chairman of Textron, Inc., "There were some transactions hidden from me . . . at least questionable and improper payments." The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against the company yesterday.

Feb. 2—The *New York Times* reports that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will present evidence to a federal grand jury about the bribery of high public officials; the officials include a U.S. Senator, 5 Congressmen, and state and local officials. In Operation Abscam, which videotaped and recorded many meetings between the agents and the officials, FBI agents posed as representatives of Arabs willing to pay well for special favors.

Feb. 3—Justice Department sources report that some original targets of the FBI investigation cooperated by offering additional information about other targets for investigation.

Feb. 4—Justice Department sources report that the evidence uncovered in its investigation into the criminal activities of public officials will be presented to federal grand juries in New York, Philadelphia, New Jersey and Washington, D.C.

Feb. 5—Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti asks congressional leaders to delay investigations by the Senate Ethics Committee and the House Ethics Committee into allegations of bribery against 8 members of Congress.

Feb. 8—President Jimmy Carter announces the appointment of Homer F. Broome as administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

The White House press office makes public President

Carter's draft plan which calls for the registration of men born in 1960-1961; the President will ask Congress to pass legislation authorizing him to order the registration of women for noncombatant service. The plan will be sent to Congress.

In Los Angeles, U.S. District Court Judge Harry Pregerson releases government documents that disclose an FBI investigation into organized crime, labor racketeering and political corruption in the south and southwest.

Feb. 11—Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti announces the appointment of U.S. Attorney for Connecticut Richard Blumenthal to supervise an internal investigation in the Justice Department to discover the means by which news agencies obtained confidential information relating to the FBI's Abscam investigation into political corruption.

Feb. 12—In a message to Congress, President Carter calls for a 15-year program to develop safe methods of storing nuclear wastes permanently; the first 5 years are to be devoted to research; the first full-scale repository will be in operation by 1995.

President Carter formally sends Congress his draft registration plans; he requests \$45 million to revive the Selective Service System.

Feb. 14—After a 2½-year investigation, FBI agents begin serving warrants on suspects in the distribution of pornography and film piracy in the Miami area; 6 individuals and 3 businesses indicted come from New York.

Feb. 25—Assistant Attorney General Phillip B. Heymann tells the Senate Ethics Committee that bribery allegations against Senator Harrison Williams, Jr. (D., N.J.) will be presented to a federal grand jury; the committee agrees to wait 90 days before demanding Justice Department evidence. Williams has been accused in the FBI Abscam case.

Feb. 29—Secretary of Agriculture Bob Berglund says that in order to cut federal spending U.S. farmers will not be paid to reduce their plantings this year.

Economy

Feb. 1—The Labor Department reports that unemployment rose to 6.2 percent in January.

Feb. 15—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index increased by 1.6 percent in January, the largest rise in more than 5 years.

The Federal Reserve Board says that the nation's industrial production rose 0.3 percent in January.

The Federal Reserve raises its discount rate to 13 percent.

Feb. 22—The Labor Department reports that the consumer price index rose 1.4 percent in January, the sharpest increase in over 6 years.

Feb. 28—The Commerce Department reports a deficit of \$4.8 billion in the U.S. balance of trade in January.

Feb. 29—The nation's major banks raise their prime interest rate to 16.75 percent.

The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.7 percent in January.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Afghanistan Crisis; Iran Crisis; Morocco; Saudi Arabia*)

Feb. 1—In New Delhi, presidential special envoy Clark M. Clifford says that the U.S. is willing to sell sophisticated military supplies to India.

Feb. 4—American and Saudi officials conclude 4 hours of talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on security issues in the

Persian Gulf region in light of the Soviet interference in Afghanistan.

Feb. 5—The State Department issues a 854-page report on the status of human rights in 154 countries. Argentina and Pakistan are singled out for criticism because of the human rights abuse in their countries.

Feb. 9—Secretary of State Vance tells the International Olympic Committee meeting in Lake Placid, N.Y., that the U.S. intention to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow next summer "reflects the deep convictions of the United States Congress and the American people."

Feb. 11—State Department officials reports that as a result of talks among officials of the U.S., Oman, Kenya and Somalia, the latter three have agreed to grant U.S. access to military facilities in their countries.

Feb. 12—President of the International Olympic Committee Lord Killanin says that the 1980 summer Olympics will take place in Moscow after the committee rejects an American proposal for a boycott. The deadline for final acceptance by nations to participate in the games is May 24.

Feb. 13—President Jimmy Carter orders a 1,800-Marine assault battalion to the Arabian Sea by the middle of March for training purposes.

Feb. 18—The U.S. formally rejoins the International Labor Organization (ILO.)

Feb. 20—The U.S. deadline for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan passes; the U.S. will not send competitors to the 1980 summer Olympic games in Moscow.

Secretary of State Vance meets with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Bonn to discuss the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Feb. 25—The State Department announces that the U.S. will sell F-15 and F-16 fighter airplanes to Egypt; Egypt expects to buy 40 \$12-million F-16's.

Feb. 29—The State Department reports that the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba has resumed maneuvers.

Labor and Industry

Feb. 7—The Chrysler Corporation reports what is believed to be a record corporate loss for 1979 of \$1.1 billion.

Feb. 14—The Standard Oil Company of Indiana (Amoco) agrees to pay \$700 million in reimbursements and accelerated investments in exploration, refining and production to settle charges of price violations made by the Energy Department.

Legislation

Feb. 6—The Senate Ethics Committee votes unanimously to conduct a "preliminary inquiry" into bribery allegations about Senator Harrison Williams, Jr. (D., N.J.) and other Senators. The House Ethics Committee continues to prepare its own investigation about the allegations against the House members. The Justice Department has asked the committees to delay their investigations for 6 months until the government completes criminal prosecutions. (See *Administration*).

Feb. 21—Representative Richard Kelly (R., Fla.) resigns from the House Republican Conference after admitting he took \$25,000 in bribes in the FBI Abscam operation.

Feb. 28—In its annual report, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress recommends federal budget cuts coupled with a \$25-billion federal tax cut in the next 18 months.

Military

Feb. 29—The Defense Department announces plans to seek approval to take 4 battleships out of mothballs and

modernize them in addition to other measures to strengthen the Navy.

Pacific Territories

Feb. 23—Meeting in Honolulu, the governors of Hawaii, Guam, the Northern Marianas and American Samoa draw up a 5-year, \$1.4-billion development plan for the 3 territories; a Pacific Island Development Council to plan the program will begin its meetings September 1.

Political Scandal

Feb. 26—76-year-old former Representative Daniel Flood (D., Pa.) pleads guilty in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., to one count of conspiracy to violate federal campaign financing laws; he is sentenced to 1 year's probation. In plea bargaining, other charges against Flood are dropped.

Politics

Feb. 26—Republican presidential hopeful and former California Governor Ronald Reagan wins a substantial victory in the New Hampshire Republican presidential primary over George Bush, Senator Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) and Representative John B. Anderson (R., Ill.).

President Jimmy Carter wins the Democratic presidential primary over Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) in New Hampshire.

Supreme Court

Feb. 19—By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court lifts a January 15 stay of a lower court ruling that declared the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional; this ruling permits the resumption of Medicaid financing of abortions.

By a 6-3 vote, the Court rules that in the case of *Snep v. U.S.* (No. 78-1871), the Central Intelligence Agency agreement that requires employees not to publish anything without prior approval is a judicially enforceable contract that applies to nonclassified as well as classified material. Frank W. Snep 3d must turn over his earnings from his book to the government as a penalty.

Feb. 20—The Court rules 5 to 4 that faculty members of private universities are "managerial" employees and that consequently the federal labor law does not protect their efforts to unionize.

Feb. 27—In a unanimous decision that overrules a 22-year precedent, the Supreme Court rules that a husband or wife may voluntarily testify against his or her spouse in a federal criminal trial.

VIETNAM

Feb. 7—In a Cabinet shakeup, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap is replaced by General Van Tien Dung and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh is replaced by Nguyen Co Thach.

YUGOSLAVIA

Feb. 21—In Belgrade, ailing President Tito sends Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev and U.S. President Jimmy Carter a plea to make the "widest efforts" to salvage détente.

ZAMBIA



Feb. 7—The *Times* of Zambia reports that the government has bought more than \$90-million worth of arms from the Soviet Union.

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

(See *Rhodesia*)

The Principal Centers of Islam

Bold figures: Muslim population in millions, based on 1975 estimates.
Figures in parentheses: percentages of total national population.



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